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A New Model of Jurisdictional Propriety
for Anglo-American Foreign Judgement
Recognition and Enforcement: Something
Old, Something Borrowed, Something
New?
ALAN REED*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a world where international trading relations increasingly
give rise to the possibility of transnational debts, the security of
commercial transactions calls for a speedy, cheap and
uncomplicated process for ensuring that judgements properly
obtained against a debtor can be satisfied, even though his
assets may be situated in another law area.
1
The increase in the level of international trade and investment
has enhanced the need for a satisfactory means of dispute
resolution.2 Dispute resolution in domestic courts requires the
respective parties to "consider not only the likelihood of a
favourable judgement but also the ability to collect on that
* Alan Reed M.A. (Cantab.), LLM (University of Virginia), Solicitor and Professor
of Criminal and Private International Law at the University of Sunderland. This article is
in dedicated to the memory of my beloved father, Matthew Alan Reed, who died on
September 28, 2002.
1. See J.D. McClean and K.W. Patchett The Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgements and the Service of Process within the Commonwealth, art. 263 (Commonwealth
Secretariat, Marlborough House, London).
2. Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgements in the United States:
In Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 255
(1991).
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judgement. '' 3 In order to collect a defendant's extra-jurisdictional
assets, the second jurisdiction must be willing to recognise and
enforce the first jurisdiction's judgement.
Modem trends show that litigants are increasingly seeking
remedies in foreign courts, and in this age of transnational
investment, losing parties are often found with substantial assets in
more than one country.4 As Adams v. Cape Industries noted,5 the
basis of enforcing these foreign judgements is "an
acknowledgement that the society of nations will work better if
some foreign judgements are taken to create rights which
supersede the underlying cause of action, and which may be
directly enforced in countries where the defendant or his assets are
to be found." The crucial question, therefore, is not whether
foreign judgements should be recognised and enforced in Anglo-
American jurisdictions, but which judgements should be
recognised and enforced.
The English response to the dilemma presented demonstrates
an ethnocentric and chauvinistic solution. English law reviews the
jurisdictional competence of the foreign court at the recognition
and enforcement stage. At present, only two forms of jurisdiction
are generally regarded at common law (and the statutory regimes,
which are based on the common law) as "proper" in an
international sense. The court of the state exercising jurisdiction,
finds jurisdiction proper when either the defendant was present in
the territory of the originating state when the action was
commenced; or, when the defendant consented by taking part in
the proceedings or by previously agreeing to jurisdiction.
The rationalisation for recognizing foreign judgement
depends on the obligation theory.6 Obligation theory is accepted
by most commentators, 7 and is defined in Schisby v. Westenholz as
3. See id. It is noteworthy that the term "judgement" includes both the recognition
and enforcement of a final judicial determination, unless otherwise specified.
4. GARY BORN AND DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 3 (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1989); see
INTERNATIONAL EXECUTION AGAINST JUDGEMENT DEBTORS (Campbell ed. 1993);
Michael Eberstein, Federal Republic of Germany, in ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGEMENTS WORLDWIDE 142 (Platto ed. 1989).
5. Adams v. Cape Indus., 1 All E.R. 929 (Ch. 1991).
6. DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Lawrence Collins ed., 12th ed.
1993).
7. See HORACE EMERSON READ, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN JUDGEMENTS IN THE COMMON LAW UNITS OF THE BRITISH
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"[T]he judgement of a court of competent jurisdiction over the
defendant imposes a duty or obligation on him to pay for the sum
for which judgement is given, which the courts in [the country of
enforcement] are bound to enforce." 8
The U.S. position on foreign judgement recognition is a
beguiling Hobson's choice9 of theoretical perspectives that apply
within respective states.10 When foreign judgements are not
barred by federal pre-emption, each state remains free to apply its
own rules respecting recognition and enforcement. These rules can
be denied on due process grounds if jurisdiction is unreasonable or
procedures are egregiously defective. In general, however, each
state determines the applicable jurisdiction test, the extent that the
court will review the judicial process that produced the judgement
in question, whether to impose choice of law tests or reciprocity
requirements, and whether the court should conduct a review on
the merits. 11  As leading commentators have suggested,
"obligation," "reciprocity" or "international comity" are the three
main competing theories of the legal topography that states
practice for foreign judgement recognition. 12  Moreover, a
significant number of states have adopted the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgements Recognition Act (1962),13 which entitles a
COMMONWEALTH 52-121 (Harvard University Press, 1938); DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 6, at 455-56.
8. 6 Eng. Rep. 155, 159 (Q.B. 1870).
9. Hobson's Choice refers to a situation in which there are only bad alternatives that
have such poor results that there is no real choice at all.
10. The United States is party to no multilateral convention on judgements. Efforts
to conclude a bilateral treaty with the United Kingdom during the 1970s were
unsuccessful. See generally David Luther Woodward, Reciprocal Recognition and
Enforcement of Civil Judgements in the United States, the United Kingdom and the
European Economic Community, 8 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 299 (1983).
11. Note that a strong, though by no means universal, tendency exists to give foreign
judgements the substantial preclusive effects that sister-state judgements enjoy. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 cmt. B (1971). "[J]udgments
rendered in a foreign nation are not entitled to the protection of full faith and credit. In
most respects, however, such judgements... will be accorded the same degree of
recognition to which sister state judgements are entitled. This is because the public
interest requires that there be an end of litigation ..." Id.
12. EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 1146-54, 1187-1212 (3d ed.
2000) [hereinafter SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS].
13. Unif. Foreign Money-Judgements Act, 13 U.L.A. 261 (Supp. 1998). The Act is in
force in twenty-seven states, as well as the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands. For
a leading decision on interpretation see Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 612 F.2d 467 (9th Cir.
1980). The Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texas versions of the Act
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sister state to "full faith and credit" to recognise and enforce the
foreign country's judgements.
This power allows a sister state to grant or deny the recovery
of a sum of money when certain conditions are fulfilled.14 The
tests for jurisdictional competence under the Act largely mirror
those under traditional English common law principles.
Three theories may be superogatory or governing in relation
to foreign judgement recognition.1 5 The first is the theory of
obligation. If the court that originally assumed jurisdiction did so
on a proper basis, the court's judgement should be regarded as a
prima facie obligation between the parties to the foreign
proceedings. The obligation is recognisable and enforceable in the
eyes of an Anglo-American court. The idea is that a foreign
judgement for damages creates a debt that the claimant can
enforce in the second jurisdiction. 16
The obligation theory has myriad perceived advantages
despite its circuitous means. As commentators have suggested, by
perceiving the foreign judgement creditor as enforcing a legal right
or obligation, it brings the matter within the penumbra of private
international law.17 It countermands the earlier notion that a
foreign judgement is only an issue of a non-obligatory
international norm.18  Furthermore, by comparing a foreign
judgement to a simple contract debt, the English judiciary made it
easy for creditors to enforce foreign judgements.19  Thus,
require reciprocity; see SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 12, at 1146-54, 1187-
1212.
14. See SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 12, at 1146-54, 1187-1212.
15. See Arthur T. von Mehren and Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign
Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1602 (1968)
[hereinafter von Mehren and Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications]; Robert C.
Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign Country Judgements: Whose Law?, 70 IOWA L. REV.
53 (1984).
16. See von Mehren and Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications, supra note
15, at 1602; Casad, supra note 15.
17. H. L. Ho, Policies Underlying the Enforcement of Foreign Commercial
Judgements, 46 I.C.L.Q. 443, 446, n.17 (1997). In Godard v. Gray the obligation theory
was preceded by an acknowledgement that, "fi]t is not an admitted principle of the law of
nations that a state is bound to enforce within its territories the judgement of a foreign
tribunal." (1870) L.R.6. Q.B. 139,148.
18. See John R. Stevenson, The Relationship of Private International Law to Public
International Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 562 (1952); Courtland H. Peterson, Res
Judicata and Foreign Country Judgements, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 291 (1963).
19. See BRADFORD A. CAFFREY, INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND THE
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGEMENTS IN THE LAWASIA
REGION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE LAWS OF ELEVEN ASIAN COUNTRIES INTER-
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obligation theory serves to justify the conclusiveness principle:
"conclusiveness originates from the conception that a foreign
judgement creates a legal obligation which is itself a sufficient
reason for its recognition."
20
The difficulty with the obligation theory is its oblique
justification. 21 According to this theory, it is unclear why a foreign
judgement creates an obligation, and why the mythical and illusory
obligation should be enforced domestically. The purported per se
allegiance to the foreign sovereign is palpably inapt,22 as the
English Court of Appeal highlighted in Adams v. Cape
Industries.23 Equally fanciful are commentators' attempts to
explain the theory on the ground of implied agreement. 24 Overall,
a simple recantation of obligation theory is insufficient to resolve
all the relevant determinants in this branch of private international
law. A complex set of values and concerns are inter-twined. 25 The
concern of maintaining international relations embodied in the
term "comity" are as cogent today, if not more so, than in 1895
when the U.S. Supreme Court recognised the importance of this
concept in the seminal case of Hilton v. Guyot.
26
Reciprocity, the second theory, is a simpler concept than
obligation. The premise is that the courts of Country A should
recognise and enforce the judgements of Country B if, mutatis
SE AND WITH THE EEC COUNTRIES (1985) at 42; SACK, CONFLICTS OF LAWS IN THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, IN REPPY (ED.), LAW-A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 1835-
1935 (1937), at 384-85; and READ, supra note 7, at 173-75.
20. Manessia Borm-Reid, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgements, 3
I.C.L.Q. 49,53 (1954).
21. Ho, supra note 17, at 445; Casad, supra note 15, at 58.
22. See Ho, supra note 17. "The idea is that a person in a foreign territory owes
allegiance to its sovereign, which allegiance entails an obligation to respect the judgements
given by the courts of the sovereign, in exchange for an obligation by the sovereign to
ensure the personal safety and well-being of the foreigner during his stay." Id. at 445 n.14;
see Carrick v. Hancock, 12 T.L.R. 59 (Q.B. 1895).
23. Adams v. Cape Indus., 1 All E.R. 929, 1038 (Ch. 1991).
24. The argument contends that by instituting or participating in the trial in the
foreign jurisdiction the parties have "impliedly agreed" to be bound by the foreign
judgement. However, in most cases the defendant cannot realistically be said to have
agreed to have the matter adjudicated in the foreign state. There is palpable inconsistency
in that the implied agreement rationale does not mesh with the fact that the default nature
of a foreign judgement does not, in most legal systems, affects its enforceability; Ernest G.
Loienzen, The Enforcement of American Judgements Abroad, 29 YALE L.J. 188, 190
(1919-1920).
25. For a list of these, see von Mehren and Trautman, Recognition of Foreign
Adjudications, supra note 15, at 1603-04.
26. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
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mutandis, the courts of Country B recognise and enforce the
judgements of Country A. A primary illustration of this principle,
which is rooted in commercial considerations, is the perspective
adopted in the Brussels Convention, and subsequently in the
Lugano Convention. The Convention's perspective imposes a
communitarian scheme on jurisdictional competence, and a free
movement of civil and commercial judgements among European
(and EFTA) Contracting States.27  The aim of the Brussels
Convention was to ensure that the economic life of the then
European Community was not disturbed by the difficulties of
enforcement of foreign judgements. 28 For civil and commercial
matters, the Brussels and Lugano Conventions provide the courts
of the contracting states the power to grant reciprocal recognition
and enforcement of judgements.
Self-interest may play an important role in the enforcement of
foreign judgements. The core of the proposition is that enforcing
foreign judgements is universally beneficial, and contrarily, that it
is a disadvantage if countries do not enforce other nations'
judgements. The hopeful anticipation is founded on a contingency:
"We do justice that justice may be done in return." 29 This idea
formed the basis of early U.S. doctrinal analysis on judgement
recognition, but today these principles now represent much more
of a hodgepodge. 30 The concept of reciprocity, however, lives on;
and the perceptions of unfair treatment emboldened the U.S.
initiative at the Hague Conference to promote a new multinational
convention. It will be fascinating to observe whether reciprocity at
the European level can be translated onto the international
27. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of the impact and ambit of the Brussels and
Lugano Conventions.
28. See Council Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1979 O.J. (C59) 1, 3 [hereinafter Council
Report].
29. Ho, supra note 17, at 434; Herbert Barry, Comity, 12 VA. L. REV. 353,359 (1926);
see generally Elliot E. Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and
Utility, 58 HARV. L. REV. 361, 373-78 (1944-1945); see generally Peter MacAllister-Smith,
Comity, in Bernhart (Ed.) Encyclopedia of Public International Law (1984) Vol. 7, at 41-
44.
30. "Any rule which tends to restrict the conclusive effect of foreign adjudication in
American courts... tends to diminish the chances for recognition of American
judgements in foreign courts ... [Riules which favor the recognition of foreign judgements
will promote increased finality for American judgements abroad." Peterson, supra note
18, at 307.
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playing field.31 Some European countries whose self-interests
wish to constrain the affairs of the existing Conventions (as well as
non-EC states) clearly oppose this concept. 32
The third theory on foreign judgement recognition is that of
comity, a principle historically relied upon as an argument for
judicial restraint. Comity is the general notion of "friendly
dealing[s] between nations at peace." 33 As such, comity applies not
just to the judiciary, but also to the policy-making bodies of the
nation. The most well-known definition of comity is arguably that
given in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Hilton v. Guyot:
Comity, in tlfe legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international
duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws.34
The judicial policy adopted in the United States has
traditionally supported the notion of comity in the international
legal system. Indeed, one circuit court described the integral
nature of this principle as "the mortar which cements together a
brick house." 35 Despite the reverent emphasis on the doctrine's
importance, the United States and foreign courts have not offered
any specific definition of comity. As a result, it is stigmatised as
31. See Eric B. Fastiff, The Proposed Hague Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgements: A Solution to Butch Reynold's
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Problems, 28 CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 469,471-73 (1995).
[Tihe U.S. litigants have a severe disadvantage in the global legal system....
[Tihe U.S. federal and state judiciaries will enforce any judgement that is valid
and fair, but foreign countries are reticent to enforce U.S. federal and state
judgements. Thus, foreign plaintiffs easily have their judgements satisfied
against U.S. defendants, but U.S. plaintiffs are often left with empty judgements.
Id.
32. Matthew H. Adler, If We Could Build It, Will They Come?-The Need for a
Multilateral Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Monetary
Judgements, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 79, 107-10 (1994); see generally Arthur T. von
Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgements: A New Approach for the
Hague Conference?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271 (1994) [hereinafter von Mehren,
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgements].
33. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 162 (1895) (Mr. William G. Choate, argument for
defendants in error).
34. Id. at 163-64.
35. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
249
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amorphous, and characterised by some as a purely voluntary
policy of non-interference among other sovereign forums. Some
even describe this policy as a "never-never land whose borders are
marked by fuzzy lines of politics, courtesy and good faith."'36 This
proposition has been criticised as being "uncertain in status and
hollow in content.., because... [it] resides in the twilight zone
between the realm of obligations and the realm of non-
obligation."
37
It is suggested, herein, that the true significance and
application of "international comity" as a theoretical policy tool
was misunderstood. The doctrine's critics have "substituted the
policy for the rule." 38 True, as a rule, comity is too indeterminate
by itself to be practicable. However, if the rule is separated from
the underlying policies, the concept of "comity" is relevant to
rationalize why foreign judgements are enforced. In Morguard
Investments Ltd v. De Savoye,39 the Supreme Court of Canada
made a striking decision that extended foreign judgement
recognition from an inter-provincial to an international level. This
case revivified the importance of "international comity," as well as
the systematic accommodation of foreign laws and judgements in
the domestic legal system. Part III explores the Morguard decision
more fully as an optimal policy tool. The Morguard decision sends
a significant message that goes to the very heart of judgement
recognition on an international playing field; provided that the
defendant is not treated unjustly it provides the claimant with an
enforceable judgement.
The policy encompassed in the notion of comity is to
propagate some frequently used terms, goodwill, cooperation,
courtesy and mutual respect among states.40 These values, "warm
and fuzzy" as they may be, are vital to the establishment and
maintenance of a stable international community.41 The novel
36. Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection
Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280,281 (1982).
37. Ho, supra note 17, at 451.
38. Id.
39. 76 D.L.R. 4th 256.
40. For expert articulation of this proposition, see Jonathan Harris, Recognition of
Foreign Judgements at Common Law-The Anti-Suit Injunction Link (1997) 17 OXFORD
J. OF LEGAL STUD. 47. See also SACK, supra note 19, at 382. (stating that the enforcement
of foreign judgements was based on the notion that "the justice of one nation should be
aiding to the justice of another nation"); Wier's Case, 1 Roll. Abr. 530, 12 (K.B. 1608).
41. Peterson, supra note 18, at 305.
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solution put forward in this article would deploy international
comity theory, but would integrate it with a more certain test that
marries together jurisdiction rules and jurisdictional competence.
The new model balances a variety of policy concerns: interests of
finality and conclusiveness of judgements; conservation of judicial
resources; certainty in the judicial process; preclusion; commercial
convenience; and sufficient flexibility to allow a dynamic test,
which allows an evolution of our recognition rules to meet
contemporary conditions.
Regardless of whichever theory is adopted, the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgements is limited by several
defences. For example, the defences of fraud, breach of natural or
substantial justice, and public policy operate as "safety valves"
against "judgements and legal processes which we simply cannot
accept. ' 42 Thus, a discretionary element must form a part of the
recognised defences. Fortunately, "judicial chauvinism has been
replaced by judicial comity."43 Whilst Anglo-American law has
recently become much more tolerant towards the differences in
values and procedures across legal systems, there should also be a
limit to that tolerance. 44 The fact that these defences hardly
succeed is helpful to our tolerance and standard of foreign justice.
Yet nonetheless, they comprise an irreducible minimum safeguard
against egregious practices.
Therefore, Part II of this Article explores, in more detail, the
Anglo-American legal position on foreign judgement recognition.
Although no "American Rule"emerges to solve the issue
presented, there exists a significant degree of vacillating ad-hocery,
and fudging of competing principles. 45 The English dependence
on obligation theory has proved highly unsatisfactory. Thus,
dynamic solutions are needed in a changing world to help preserve
the possibility of altering the scope of the recognition rules. In
42. Ho, supra note 17, at 445. This article focuses on the policy issues surrounding
these three key defences.
43. The Abidin Daver 1 All. E.R. 398, at 411 (1984).
44. Unsurprisingly, the aforementioned defences form a significant element of the
Multilateral Convention's preliminary draft under the auspices of the Hague Conference.
See Preliminary Draft Hague Judgements Convention adopted by the preparatory Special
Commission on October 30, 1999 available at http://www.hcch.netle/conventionsl
draft36e.html; see generally Paul R. Beaumont, A United Kingdom Perspective on the
Proposed Hague Judgements Convention (1998) 24 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 75; Beaumont
(1999) 48 I.C.L.Q. 225.
45. See Woodward, supra note 10, at 299.
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essence, as Harris has intimated, the cornerstone to recognition
rules is international harmony and commercial practicality on
homogenous grounds; not the fact that different states share
similar bases for accepting jurisdiction.
46
Part III of this Article addresses the need for a reformulated
dual test for judgement recognition on both sides of the Atlantic.
Rationalisation needs to defer to foreign courts, not merely in the
name of comity, but also thosc of consistcncy, convcnience and
certainty. The current law appears hopelessly anachronistic and
the solution propounded herein would arguably bridge the
perceived ethnocentric gap. Interestingly, for some undefined
reason, private international lawyers have generally separated the
jurisdiction by the originating court (F1) and the recognition of
foreign judgements (by F2) "as two separate and distinct branches
of the law, with little in common but much between them: the "in
between" part being the rules on choice of law." 47 The risk of
separating the rules on jurisdiction and judgements is that legal
thought develops independently in one branch, though the two
branches are inherently collinear. The doctrine on recognition
"begins with the search for a foreign court which had jurisdiction
in the 'international sense."' The corollary of this is that there is a
requirement to integrate the law on recognition of foreign judgements
more closely into private international law, and not to view
jurisdictional rules as divorced from recognition of foreign judgements.
This is the beneficial effect of the novel optimal test considered in detail
in Part I1: (1) a presumption of judgement recognition derived
from international comity principles; (2) a rebuttable presumption
of the jurisdictional competence of the foreign court; (3) reversal
of the burden of proof to the defendant to show recognition or
enforcement to be unjust; and (4) unjustness equiparated to the
unconscionability test for restraint of foreign proceedings in the
jurisdictional context.
Part IV of this Article examines the defences of public policy,
natural justice, and fraud from an Anglo-American perspective.
New reformulated tests for these defences call for the recognising
courts to intervene only in cases where the enforcement will result
in "a violation of a fundamental norm of substantive value or of
46. See Harris, supra note 40; Adrian Briggs, Which Foreign Judgements Should We
Recognize Today?, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 240 (1987) [hereinafter Briggs, Which Foreign
Judgements?].
47. Briggs, Which Foreign Judgements?, supra note 46, at 240.
[Vol. 25:243
2003] Foreign Judgement Recognition and Enforcement 253
procedural justice."4 8 A higher threshold test is suggested in the
context that, although the principle of finality is an important
factor, there are sometimes other overriding considerations:
Inasmuch as the foreign judgement will have been rendered
under a system that may show a difference in the substantive
law, and---especially in civil law countries-will almost
invariably show a marked difference in the laws of procedure
and evidence, in the schooling and selection of judges, and in
the general political, social, and economic outlook (always to
some extent reflected in the judicial machinery), a second local
lawsuit would definitely not be a mere duplication of the prior
foreign proceedings. 49
Under traditional common law principles, a foreign judgement will
not be enforceable if it is contrary to the public policy of the
enforcement state. The recent decisions of Bachchan50 and
Telnikoff,51 where American courts refused to recognise or
enforce English libel judgements, reveal the dangers of undue
sensitivity being deployed to this "safety-valve." They also
highlight in sharp focus how difficult it will be to achieve an
effective public policy criterion under the proposed world-wide
convention.52 If English libel law is stigmatised as contrary to the
susceptibilities of U.S. state laws, given our shared histories,
common law tradition and replication of libel law principles until
1964, the problems involving developing nations or civil codes are
vastly multiplied. Chances of successful prediction may be as
likely as defining how many angels can dance upon the head of a
pin. The solution proposed herein is a very narrowly drawn
definition with public policy impacted only where enforcement
would violate the state's most basic notions of morality and justice.
In general, the public policy defence sets a limit to accept the
48. Ho, supra note 17, at 462. Policy interests are at stake here in relation to finality,
preclusiveness, fairness to judgement creditors, and the conservation of judicial resources.
Procedural justice in the realm of fairness to the judgement debtor and public policy are
also cogent. Interest in finality is prominent in U.S. commentaries and case law. Baldwin
v. Iowa Travelling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1981); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS 2d, Vol. 1, cmt. § 98, at 298.
49. Hans Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States,
9 UCLA L. REV. 44,62 (1962).
50. Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'n, 585, N.Y.S. 2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
51. Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d. 230,249 (Md. 1997).
52. See Kyu Ho Youm, The Interaction Between American and Foreign Libel Law: US
Courts Refuse to Enforce English Libel Judgements, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 131 (2000).
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foreign law and legal system as part of the enforcement court's
duty to protect the fundamental social norms prevailing in the
society in which enforcement is sought. As its name suggests, the
public policy defence impacts "public" concerns and these
concerns are primarily substantive in origin.
The other defences considered in this article are more
relevant to a case-by-case analysis. A foreign judgement will not
be enforced if it was obtained by fraud, which essentially concerns
matters of procedural justice. Application of the defence does not,
as some critics have suggested, unduly subvert the finality of
judgements or show an improper lack of respect for the
competence of foreign courts. 53 If a foreign claimant has obtained
a judgement by fraud, he has obtained, by virtue of the judgement
itself, a chose in action. 54 Arguably obtaining the property by
fraud equates to the commission of a quasi-tort, separate and
distinct from the claim actually brought in the foreign court. On
this view, the defendant should be entitled to seek relief for the
quasi-tort, requiring a fresh examination of some of the
evidence.55 The primary issue, thus, becomes the threshold test
for the defendant to meet in order to convince the judgement-
recognising court to engage in a reappraisal. Again, here is a
scenario where jurisdictional rules and recognition principles need
to be integrated more closely than at present. The optimal model
in Part IV looks to the test of "good arguable case," as interpreted
by the House of Lords in Seaconsar Far East Ltd. v. Bank Markazi
Iran,56 which governs extended jurisdiction under the English Civil
Procedure Rules. The evidence in support of an application must
state the claimant's belief that the claim has a reasonable prospect
of success.
Another defence is that the foreign proceedings in which the
judgement was obtained were contrary to natural justice, a defense
rarely applied. Although administering justice is a priority, justice,
53. GEOFFREY C. CHESHIRE AND SIR PETER NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 444 (Sir Peter North & J.J. Fawcett eds. 13th ed., 1999); see also J. G. Collier, Fraud
Still Unravels Foreign Judgements, 51 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 441 (1992).
54. Adrian Briggs, Foreign Judgements, Fraud and the Brussels Convention, 108
L.Q.R. 532 (1991) [hereinafter Briggs, Brussels Convention]; Adrian Briggs, Foreign
Judgements; More Surprises, 109 L.Q.R. 549, 550 (1992) [hereinafter Briggs, More
Surprises].
55. Briggs, Brussels Convention, supra note 54, at 531; Briggs, More Surprises, supra
note 54, at 550.
56. [1994] 1 A.C. 438.
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out of deference to international relations, must be interpreted
with a tolerant perspective. Part V considers the ambit of natural
justice defense, with careful attention to the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions to this specific defence, and concerns that the
defendant has been given due notice and proper opportunity to be
heard.57 The reformulated test under the Brussels Regulation,
58
which came into effect on March 1, 2002, is evaluated against the
nebulous concept of natural justice in Anglo-American tradition,
as embodied by the decision of the English Court of Appeal in
Adams v. Cape Industries.
59
The concluding section of this article reviews the need to
reorder interests in the field of recognition and enforcement
according to the newly proposed standard of jurisdictional
propriety. It sets this standard in the contextual background,
successful or otherwise, of a new universalist solution through the
auspices of the Hague Conference towards a multilateral
Convention. Furthermore, this section also considers the
legitimate ambit and composition of discretionary defences to
recognition and enforcement. The new dual model integrates
jurisdictional principles into a jurisdictional competence test. The
solution adopted would bridge the perceived ethnocentric gap that
prevails under traditional English common law analysis. The
edifice constructed would arguably allow for freer movement of
judgements, an appropriate balance between certainty and
flexibility and solicitation of legitimate rights of both claimant and
defendant.
57. See Part V.
58. Council Regulation 44/2001/EEC, 2000 O.J. (L 12) 1. This replaces the Brussels
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 8 LL.M. 229 (entered into force Sept. 27, 1968) in all European Union member
states except Denmark [hereinafter Brussels Convention]. The Brussels Regulation, like
the Brussels Convention before it, deals with which member states' courts have
jurisdiction in civil and commercial disputes.
59. Adams v. Cape Indus., 1 All E.R. 929 (Eng. 1991).
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II. JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE: ANGLO-AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVES
A. The American Position
For many years the topic of recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgements has been the scholar's delight. Students of
conflict of laws, constitutional law, comparative law,
international law, and civil procedure have explored its
complexities and have proposed reforms. Yet, these efforts
have not significantly influenced American law. 60
The statement above remains true in the modern world today.
The existing U.S. jurisprudence on foreign-judgement recognition
represents a "coat of many colors." 61 The state recognition laws
derive historically in part from the analysis in Hilton v. Guyot.62
Many domestic states have adopted the law of Hilton despite its
neutralized precedential value following Erie Railway Co. v.
Tompkins,63 which did away with federal common law in diversity
cases. Furthermore, "some... states have adopted the Uniform
Recognition Act, the relevant provisions do not differ greatly from
the rule of Hilton."64 Thus, the extant sources of recognition law
in the United States are the state common law derived from Hilton
and the Uniform Recognition Act.65
Pittman identified early U.S. decisions which refused to give
preclusive effect to foreign judgements. "[A] foreign judgement
[served as] prima facie evidence of the underlying claim.., and
that all defences that were or could have been raised in the foreign
action[s] could be re-litigated in a North American action." 66
60. Adolf Homburger, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgements: A New
Yorker Reflects on Uniform Acts, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 367,368 (1970).
61. See Jonathan Pittman, The Public Policy Exception to the Recognition of Foreign
Judgements, 22 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 969, 973 (1989); Juan Carlos Martinez,
Recognizing and Enforcing Foreign Nation Judgements: The United States and Europe
Compared and Contrasted-A Call for Revised Legislation in Florida, 4 J. TRANSNAT'L L
& POL'Y 49, 80-81 (1995); see Woodward, supra note 10, at 305-06.
62. Hilton, 159 U.S. 113, 133 (1895).
63. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Pittman, supra note 61, at 973.
64. Erie, 304 U.S. 64; Pittman, supra note 61, at 973.
65. Pittman, supra note 61, at 973.
66. Id. (emphasis added); Robert B. von Mehren and Michael E. Patterson,
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Country Judgements in the United States, 6 LAW
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Subsequently, U.S. courts "began to recognize foreign judgements
as conclusive on the merits as long as basic requirements were
met."' 67 These requirements were set out by the United States
Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot:
68
[W]here there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial
abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction ... upon
regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance
of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to
secure an impartial administration of justice between the
citizens of its own country and those of other countries; and
there is nothing to show either prejudice ... or fraud in
procuring the judgement, or any other special reason why the
comity of this nation should not allow it full effect, the merits of
the case should not, in an action brought in this country upon
the judgement, be tried afresh, as on a new trial or an appeal,
upon the mere assertion of the party that the judgement was
erroneous in law or in fact."
69
In addition to these elements, the Hilton Court demanded
reciprocity, which subsequent decisions largely disregarded;70 yet
the comity analysis was maintained and further developed by case
law71 and the Uniform Recognition Act.
A second early decision on judgement enforcement is Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins.72 In Erie, the Supreme Court eliminated
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 37, 43 (1974) [hereinafter von Mehren and Patterson, Foreign
Country Judgments].
67. Pittman, supra note 61, at 973.
68. Hilton, 159 U.S. 113.
69. Id. at 202-03 (1895).
70. See, e.g., Tahan v. Hodgson; 662 F.2d. 862, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1981); and Somportex
Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435,440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert denied, 405
U.S. 1017 (1972).
71. Note that the doctrine was further embellished in Somportex Ltd. where Judge
Aldisert of the Third Circuit opined,
[clomity is a recognition which one nation extends within its own territory to
the ... judicial acts of another. It is not a rule of law, but one of practice,
convenience and expediency. Although more than mere courtesy and
accommodation, comity does not achieve the force of an imperative or
obligation. Rather, it is a nation's expression of understanding which
demonstrates due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the
rights of persons protected by its own laws. Comity should be withheld only
when its acceptance would be contrary or prejudicial to the interest of the nation
called upon to give it effect.
Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435,440 (3d Cir. 1971)
cert. denied
72. Erie, 304 U.S. 64.
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federal common law and held that federal courts sitting in diversity
jurisdiction shall apply state law.73 This point was clearly espoused
in Johnson v. Compagne Generale Transatlantique,74 when the
New York state court rejected Hilton and determined that New
York law unilaterally applied to actions brought in New York,
which seek recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements.
75
The result has been a patchwork of state and federal court
decisions interpreting or projecting state law, and more recent
statutes. For instance, an English court's judgement might well be
enforceable in New York, but not in New Jersey. Consequently, a
new solution is needed to meet the goals of uniformity among and
between states, as well as the acceptance of U.S. judgements in
foreign courts.
Absent federal preemption, the trend is clearly away from
Hilton and toward recognition similar to that of sister-state
judgements. Such is the case with the number of states that
adopted the Uniform Recognition of Foreign Judgements Act.
76
The rationale of the Act is to codify the common law and to
increase the probability that U.S. judgements will be recognised
abroad in states with reciprocity requirements. 77 In truth, the Act
enjoys significant collinearity with the traditional English common
law system.78 For example, the Act only applies to foreign
judgements that grant or deny recovery of a sum of money, but it
does not apply to judgements for tax penalties, or for support in
matrimonial matters or family matters.79 In addition, it does not
embrace orders for specific performance or injunctions. The Act
essentially codifies the English requirement of finality in the
73. Id. at 78, see Somportex, 453 F.2d. at 440 (applying state law, as concerning the
recognition of foreign judgements, pursuant to Erie, 304 U.S. 64).
74. Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121 (N.Y. 1926).
75. The court stated, "a right acquired under a foreign judgement may be established
in this state without reference to the rules of evidence laid down by the courts of the
United States. Comity is not a rule of law, but it is a rule of 'practice, convenience and
expediency' ... It therefore rests, not on the basis of reciprocity, but rather upon the
persuasiveness of the foreign judgement." Id. at 123 (quoting Froos & Co. v. Stover Mfg.
Co., 177 U.S. 485,488 (1900)).
76. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgements Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. 261 (Master ed.
1986 and 1998 Supp.); see Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 612 F.2d. 467, 470-71 (9th Cir.
1980).
77. von Mehren and Patterson, Foreign Country Judgments, supra note 66, at 42.
78. Pittman, supra note 61, at 973.
79. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgements Recognition Act, supra note 76, § 1.
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foreign judgement.80 Additionally, foreign judgement need not be
recognised if the defendant lacked notice of the suit and an
opportunity to defend against any claims,81 if the judgement was
obtained by fraud, or if the underlying cause of action or claim for
relief is repugnant to the public policy of the United States. 82
Moreover, a foreign judgement is not considered conclusive if the
foreign court was not impartial,83 did not have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, 84 or did not have jurisdiction over
the subject matter at issue in the case. 85
As is the position under traditional English principles, the
U.S. state court must recognize the foreign court's jurisdictional
competence over the defendant in order for the foreign judgement
to be considered conclusive. 86 The Act sets out six instances in
which the U.S. state court must recognise a foreign court's
jurisdiction. 87 These instances are constrained to those in which
the defendant (1) was personally served in the foreign
80. Id. § 2.
81. Id. § 4 (b)(1).
82. Id. § 4 (b)(3).
83. Id. § 4 (a)(1).
84. Id. § 4 (a)(2).
85. Id. § 4 (a)(3).
86. See id. § 4(a)(2). By common law principles developed from Hilton v. Guyot, a
foreign court must have "jurisdiction over the cause" in the eyes of U.S. law, if the foreign
judgement is to be recognized by a U.S. court. Id. § 4 Comment. Hence, when a foreign
judgement is rendered against a U.S. national, U.S. courts have held that, "jurisdiction
should be determined by our own standards of judicial power as promulgated by the
Supreme Court under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." C.f., Hunt
v. DP Exploration Co. (Libya) 492 F. Supp. 885, 895 (N.D. Tex. 1980). As a consequence,
the jurisdictional test replicates that used by U.S. courts to determine if a U.S. state
judgement is entitled to full faith and credit, i.e. the "minimum contacts" test derived from
International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) and its progeny. Moreover,
minimum contacts is traditionally established when the defendant conducted business in
the foreign jurisdiction or shipped products there. Cf., Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d.
830, 838 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying minimum contacts test of International Shoe).
Jurisdictional competence may also be predicated upon the defendant consenting to the
foreign court's jurisdiction, either explicitly in a prior agreement between the parties, or
impliedly through the defendant's appearance and participation in the foreign proceeding.
Cf, Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 631 F. Supp. 314, 317 (N.D. I11. 1986). It is
evident that U.S. courts recognise jurisdiction based on consent, even though the foreign
court may not have any other basis for jurisdiction. However, a U.S. court will not deem
the defendant to have consented to the foreign court's jurisdiction if the defendant's
appearance in the foreign court was solely to contest the foreign court's jurisdiction. C.f.,
Royal Bank of Canada v. Trentham Corp., 491 F. Supp. 404,406 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
87. See Uniform Foreign Money-Judgements Recognition Act, supra note 76, § 5(a).
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jurisdiction; 88 (2) appeared voluntarily in the foreign proceeding
other than to contest jurisdiction; 89 (3) agreed to submit to the
jurisdiction of the foreign court prior to the action;90 (4) was
domiciled in the foreign state;91 (5) had a business office in the
foreign state and the suit arose out of the conduct of that
business;92 or (6) operated a motor vehicle or aircraft in the
foreign jurisdiction and the suit arose out of that operation.93
Evidently, the Act contemplated jurisdiction according to U.S.
principles, a fact highlighted by the provision that a U.S. court can
recognise the foreign judgement on grounds not specified in the
Act.94
In evaluating the present U.S. statutes and decisions on
foreign judgement recognition, we find a gallimaufry of principles
and conclusions. Common law does not entitle a foreign country
judgement conclusive "full faith and credit" like the judgements of
sister states under the U.S. Constitution; rather the foreign
judgement is entitled to comity. Moreover, a foreign country
judgement, under the doctrine of Hilton v. Guyot, is entitled to
conclusive effect only if "the foreign country which rendered the
judgement gives reciprocity to judgements rendered in the courts
of the U.S."' 95 Clearly, the modern trend in U.S. courts is to
recognise the foreign judgement if all the elements of due process
and civilized procedures are met; but there still exist certain well-
recognised defences to the enforcement of a foreign judgement
such as fraud, natural justice or public policy contrary to the
judgement. Overall, there is no uniformity in U.S. courts as to
when and under what circumstances a foreign judgement will be
given conclusive effect. Instead, it is "a matter of individual state
common law and whether the particular state has adopted the
Uniform Recognition Law." 96  Not all states have done so,
8& Id. § 5(a)(1). But see id. § 4(b)(6) (permitting the court not to recognise
jurisdiction based solely on personal service if the foreign forum was "seriously
inconvenient").
89. Id. § 5(a)(2).
90. Id. § 5(a)(3).
91. Id. § 5(a)(4).
92. Id. § 5(a)(5).
93. Id. § 5(a)(6).
94. See id. § 5(b).
95. Joseph J. Simeone, The Recognition and Enforceability of Foreign Country
Judgements, 37 ST .Louis U. L.J. 341,357 (1993).
96. Id.
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creating a situation where there is no national uniformity as to
when and under what circumstances a foreign judgement will be
enforced in the courts of the United States.
97
This beguiling uncertainty harms the United States during
significant increases in transnational trade and investment.
98
Foreign distrust of the American judicial system handicaps U.S.
negotiations of international trading contracts. 99 Furthermore, the
difficulties attached to reciprocity make U.S. law determinative
not only to the enforcement of foreign judgements therein, but
also to the enforcement of U.S. judgements abroad. Reciprocity
requirements are part of judgements recognition and enforcement
law in many foreign nations. A befuddled creditor is consequently
placed in an invidious position over identifying apposite state laws
in the U.S. In essence, a U.S. judgement creditor seeking
enforcement in a country requiring reciprocity will need to
establish that a similar judgement would likewise be enforced in
the originating U.S. court. This will not be problematic if the state
that issued the judgement has adopted the Recognition Act.100
Reciprocity also presents no difficulty in the context of the
Brussels and Lugano Convention between E.U. and EFTA
Contracting States, with harmonisation of jurisdiction and
recognition principles, reciprocal arrangements, and free
circulation of judgements. It will, however, cause severe concerns
97. Id. at 343.
98. See generally William Honey and Marc Hall, Bases for Recognition of Foreign
Nation Money Judgements in the U.S. and Need for Federal Intervention, 16 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 405 (1993).
99. See von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgements, supra note
32, at 278. In many countries, substantially less preclusive effect is accorded U.S.
judgements than would be available to a comparable foreign judgement in the United
States. U.S. judgements abroad encounter reciprocity requirements and are subject to the
imposition of choice of law test. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Hague Judgements
Convention: A Game Worth Playing?, Paper delivered at the British Institute of
International and Comparative Law (Oct. 29, 1998) (on file with author). The real
problem with torts is the rest of the world's horror at how torts, particularly personal
injury claims, are handled in the United States. The combination of contingent fees, no
fee shifting, wide-ranging discovery, the role and behaviour of juries, frequent award of
damages for "pain and suffering," less frequent but ever threatening award of punitive
damages, and the sheer size of U.S. damage awards, scares the rest of the world,
particularly manufacturers and insurance companies. It was this issue, more than any
other, which led to the collapse of the U.S.-British negotiations in the 1970s.
100. Note that explicit in the purposes of the Recognition Act, is the hope that
"[c]odification by a state of its rules on the recognition of money-judgements rendered in a
foreign court, will make it more likely that judgements rendered in the state will be
recognized abroad." Uniform Foreign Money-Judgements Recognition Act, supra note 76.
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where a state has twinned the Recognition Act with a reciprocity
criterion. The spectre of renvoi is implicated, in which the forum's
jurisdiction rule "may require reference to the granting
jurisdiction's rule for private international law purposes."
101
It is self-evident that the possibility of over fifty separate and
different rules continues to make matters difficult in explaining
U.S. law to a foreign court.10 2 The laudable attempt to simplify
and unify state law through the Uniform Recognition Act has been
unsuccessful due to a large number of dissenting states. These
states refuse to enter into the scheme because they are allied to the
inclusion by some adopting states of Hilton v. Guyot's reciprocity
requirement. 10 3 Hence, it is simply "not possible to discuss U.S.
judgements recognition law in generalities without constant
reference to exceptional cases."
10 4
A new standard test, based on the jurisdictional propriety
model suggested herein, would reduce the present complexity and
array of variables, and should lead to a better understanding of the
relevant U.S. law by foreign courts. This universalist model would
efficiently identify the tenets of international comity and integrate
jurisdictional precepts, thus facilitating foreign enforcement of
U.S. judgements. First, it is instructive to briefly analyse the
ethnocentric and chauvinistic perspective that operates under
English common law to judgement recognition.
101. See Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Judgements in the United States and
Europe, 13 J.L. & COM. 193,200-01 (1994).
102. See Robert B. von Mehren, Enforcement of Foreign Judgements in the United
States, 17 VA. J. INT'L L 401,404-08 (1977) (arguing for a federal common law rule on the
enforcement of judgements for practical reasons).
U.S. judgements may be denied enforcement abroad because a foreign court
erroneously assumes that U.S. courts would not enforce its judgements. The
presence of a single federal common law of enforcement would reduce the
present complexity and should lead to a better understanding of the relevant
U.S. law by foreign courts. This would make it simpler to show U.S. reciprocity
and therefore easier to obtain foreign enforcement of U.S. judgements.
Id.
103. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9.12-114 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 10-1404(2) (g) (Michie
1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 235 § 23A (West 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2329.92 (2001) Table T-1 under Ohio section; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524.11 (1997)
(requiring reciprocity to enforce a Canadian judgement); see, e.g., Corporacion
Salvadorena de Calzado, S.A. v. Injection Footwear Corp., 533 F. Supp. 290,299 (S.D. Fla.
1982); see EUGENE F. SCHOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS at 1191 (3d ed. 2000).
104. See Brand supra note 101, at 200.
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B. The English Common Law Position
Since the seventeenth century, English courts have recognised
and enforced foreign judgements at common law.10 5 The older
cases based this privilege solely on the ground of comity, with
reference to the law of nations requirement that one country's
courts assist those of another.10 6 The doctrine of obligation,
however, supplanted the doctrine of comity in the nineteenth
century and prevails to modem days. The doctrine vested a new
right in the creditor and imposed a new obligation on the debtor at
the instance of the foreign court.10 7 In no sense does the foreign
judgement creditor ask an English court to enforce a foreign-
created right, for his obligation was created inherently from
English private international law. 10 8 Furthermore, the available
defences for such an action are exclusively English legal creations.
In essence, the English court enforces an English-created, not a
foreign-created, obligation.10 9 As this section exemplifies, the
"obligation" is peculiarly English-centric and fails to consider the
jurisdictional principles of a foreign, non-English court.
The traditional English common law model operates as a
corollary to the Brussels and Lugano Convention principles
relating to recognition and enforcement, and upon consistent
jurisdiction between Contracting European and EFTA States.
110
While the Convention's scope is limited to "civil and commercial"
matters, English recognition and enforcement of judgements in
matters outside civil and commercial issues will still be based on
the common law, or if a bilateral treaty exists under Part II of the
Administration of Justice Act 1920, or the Foreign Judgements
105. SACK, supra note 19, at 342,381-82.
106. Roach v. Garvan, 1 Ves. Sen. 157, 158 (1748).
107. Russell v. Smyth, 9 M & W 810, 819 (1842); Williams v. Jones, 13 M & W 628, 633
(1845); Schibsby v. Westenholz, 6 L.R. QB. 155,159 (1870), where Blackburn J. asserted:
We think that ... the true principle on which the judgements of foreign tribunals
are enforced in England is... that the judgement of a court of competent
jurisdiction over the defendant imposes a duty or obligation on the defendant to
pay the sum for which judgement is given which the courts in this country are
bound to enforce; and consequently that anything which negatives that duty, or
forms a legal excuse for not performing it, is a defence to the action.
Id.
108. Dennis Campbell and Dharmendra Popat, Enforcing American Money
Judgements in the United Kingdom and Germany, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 517, 528-29 (1994).
109. J.D. MCLEAN, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 136-56,137 (Sweet and Maxwell 2000).
110. Collier, supra note 53, at 442-43.
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(Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933.111 Significantly, these
traditional common law principles are still determinative to
judgements from the Americas, Africa, Asia and most countries in
Eastern Europe and the Middle East.112  Consequently,
judgements from the United States, Japan, China, Brazil or Egypt
can only be enforced at common law.
A fundamental dichotomy exists between the enforcement of
judgements under the Brussels and Lugano Conventions and
common law, a distinction significant to the judgement debtor.
113
The Conventions' tenets of simplification and speed allow for
expedited recognition and enforcement of judgements throughout
the Contracting States. 114 Basically, it is provided that no defence
will generally exist where the defendant alleges either a lack of
jurisdiction in the original court or that it decided the dispute
incorrectly. Hence, the requisite advice for such a client would be
to fully contest the matter before the first adjudicating court, and
not to allow a judgement by default. Clearly, "he has little to gain
from keeping his powder dry." 115 The position, however, radically
differs from common law, which allows a direct challenge to the
adjudicating court's jurisdiction and a far wider range of effective
defences. Tactically, the client's position depends upon whether
the adjudicating court is a Contracting State or non-Contracting
State.
111. The Foreign Judgements (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933 provides for the
recognition and enforcement of money judgements given by foreign countries (including
those of Commonwealth countries). Like the 1920 Act, it applies only to judgements of
countries to which it has been extended by Order in Council, on the basis of their having
made reciprocal provision for the recognition and enforcement of U.K. judgements. This
Act is more important than the Act of 1920 because it is drafted in much more detail, and
contains specific rules on when foreign courts are deemed to have jurisdiction for the
purposes of the Act, and on what defences the defendant may set up in opposition to an
application to register a foreign judgement. These rules are modeled very closely on those
of the common law. Registration of a judgement under the Act is available as of right
instead of merely at discretion as under the Act of 1920.
112. Collier, supra note 53, at 442.
113. Id. at 442-43. Note that a judgement creditor seeking to enforce a foreign
judgement in England at common law cannot do so by direct execution of the judgement,
but must bring an action on the foreign judgement. Hence, a creditor can apply for
summary judgement under Part 24 of the Civil Procedure Rules on the ground that the
defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim; and if the application is
successful, the defendant will not be allowed to defend at all.
114. Collier, supra note 53, at 442-43.
115. ADRIAN BRIGGS AND PETER REES, NORTON ROSE ON CIVIL JURISDICTION
AND JUDGEMENTS 239 (Lloyds of London Press, 1993).
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1. English recognition of the originating court's jurisdictional
competence
A judgement debtor's best defense is to assert that the foreign
adjudicating court lacked jurisdiction over him. Thus, the English
court must recognise the foreign court's jurisdiction. Having
jurisdiction under its own rules is insufficient.11 6 Since the second
half of the nineteenth century when English common law relating
to jurisdiction was based on presence and submission, a radical
transformation extended exorbitant jurisdiction (now under Rule
6.20 of the Civil Procedure Rules), and the test of appropriateness
(jurisdictional propriety) came to dominate the jurisdictional
enquiry. No longer is it true to simply assert that an English court
assumes jurisdiction on the grounds of presence and submission.
An English court may assume jurisdiction over an absent
defendant if England is the forum conveniens, but may decline
jurisdiction against a defendant who is present in England if
another forum is more appropriate." 7 Unfortunately, there has
not been a reciprocal shift in attitude to jurisdictional competence
issues in cases concerning foreign judgements where antediluvian
and anomalous treatment still governs. No integration applies
between jurisdictional principles and foreign judgement
recognition.11
8
a. presence or residence
Of the five cases listed in Emanuel v. Symon in which English
courts will enforce a foreign judgement, "residency," "presence,"
and submission remain active concepts in discussing modern
jurisdictional competence.11 9 Specifically, courts will enforce a
foreign judgement "where [the defendant] was a resident in the
foreign country when the action began; where the defendant in the
character of plaintiff has selected the forum in which he is
afterwards sued; where he has voluntarily appeared; [and] where
he has contracted to submit himself to the forum in which the
116. Buchanan v. Rucker (1808) 32 Eng. Rep. 546 (K.B. 1808); see also Singh v. Rajah
of Faridkote A.C. 670, 684 (1894) (appeal taken from India).
117. See Patrick Borchers, Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the United States and the
European Community: Lessons for American Reform, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 121,128 (1992).
118. JAFFEY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 157 (C.M.V. Clarkson & Jonathan Hill eds.,
1997).
119. Emanuel v. Symon, 1 K.B. 302, at 309 (1908) (repeating observations made by Fry
J. in Rousillon v. Rousillon, 14 Ch. D 351,371 (Eng. 1880)).
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judgement was obtained. ' 120 In evaluating the test of "residence,"
it is necessary to examine whether residency or mere transitory
presence when process is issued, will suffice. Additionally, the
connection test is important for corporations, being an artificial
concept and not a natural individual, for which the concept of
residence/presence can only be applied in a superficial and
attenuated form.
A. Presence or Residence of Corporations within the Jurisdiction
of the Foreign Court
The reference in Emanuel to "when the action began," relates
to when process of the foreign courts was served on the defendant,
and not when it was issued from that court. 121 This time reference
makes irrelevant the fact that the defendant was present in the
foreign country when the cause of action accrued, but
subsequently departed before proceedings commenced. Until
quite recently, foreign jurisdictional competence required
residence, not simply transitory presence. 122 In Adams v. Cape
Industries,123 however, the Court of Appeal affirmed, en passant,
that presence, not residence, sufficed. Their Lordships referred to
the early authority of Carrick v. Hancock,124 which asserted that
serving the defendant during his short visit in Sweden gave
Swedish courts sufficient jurisdiction over him. In any event, he
submitted to foreign jurisdiction by taking part in the proceedings.
Carrick predicated jurisdiction by presence upon territorial
dominion with "all persons within any territorial dominion owe
their allegiance to its sovereign power and obedience to all its laws
and to the lawful jurisdiction of its Courts."'125 Adams, following
earlier authorities, 126 held that physical presence was sufficient,
120. Emanuel v. Symon, 1 K.B. 302, 309 (1908) (citing Rousillon v. Rousillon, 14 Ch.
D 351,371 (Eng. 1880)).
121. Collier, supra note 53, at 442-43
122. DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 6, Rule 37.
123. 1 All. E.R. 929 (Ch. 1991); J. G. Collier, Conflicts and Company Law Combine to
Bar Enforcement of Asbestos Damages, CAMBRIDGE L.J. 416 (1990); P. B. Carter, Private
International Law, 61 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L., 395,402-03 (1991).
124. Carrick v. Hancock, 12 T.L.R. 59, 59-60 (Q.B. 1895).
125. Id.
126. Adams v. Cape Indus., 1 All E.R. 929, 1002 (Ch. 1991) (citing Singh v. Rajah of
Faridkote, A.C. 670P.C. (1894)); id. at 1003 (citing Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. Ltd.
v. Sedgwick, Collins & Co. Ltd. 1927 A.C. 95).
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leaving uncertain the issue of whether residence without presence
at the time of service of process would also suffice. 127
Presence, as opposed to residence, enjoys the virtues of
simplicity and ease of application. It also replicates a basis of
English court jurisdiction. 128 However, where English jurisdiction
is invoked on the basis of mere temporary presence, the forum non
conveniens doctrine will allow a stay of action if England is an
inappropriate forum. 129  Here, jurisdictional principles and
jurisdictional competence diverge as international comity
principles have unfortunately been subjugated in favour of the
obligation theory viewed introspectively through blinkered
English eyes.
As for the presence or residence of corporations within the
foreign court's jurisdiction, the fact that a corporate defendant is
not a natural person, makes somewhat artificial the ascription of
jurisdictional competence. Prior to Adams, courts had held a
company present in a foreign country where it conducted business
on a definite and somewhat reasonably permanent place at the
time proceedings commenced. 130  A corporation could also
establish presence through a representative who possessed the
power to conclude contracts on the corporation's behalf without
submitting them to the company for prior approval. 131 Thus, a
representative that was a mere "mouthpiece" or channel of
communication was insufficient to establish presence.
Adams v. Cape Industries132  reveals that matters of
jurisdictional competence have been left to the judiciary's
solipsistic determination. The plaintiffs in 205 consolidated actions
sought to enforce a default judgement against the defendants in a
U.S. District Court sitting in the State of Texas. The main
question was whether the defendant, an English parent company
of a group of subsidiaries which mined and marketed asbestos in
South Africa, and a wholly owned subsidiary, Capasco, were
present for the purposes of the jurisdiction of the Texas court. The
127. Id. at 1004.
128. Colt Indus., Inc. v. Sarlie, 1 W.L.R. 440, 444 (1966); Baroda v. Wildenstein 2 Q.B.
283,292 (1972); Campbell and Popat, supra note 108, at 535.
129. JONATHON HILL, THE LAW RELATING To INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
DISPUTES 243 (Lloyds of London 1994).
130. Littauer Glove Co. v. F.W. Millington, 44 T.L.R. 746 (K.B. 1928).
131. See, e.g., Sfeir & Co. v. Nat'l. Ins. Co. of New Zealand Ltd., 1 Lloyd's Rep 330
(Q.B. 1964); Vogel v. R. & A. Kohnstamm Ltd., 1973 Q.B. 133 (Eng C.A.).
132. 1 All. E.R. 929 (Ch. 1991).
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plaintiffs' actions, which alleged personal injuries from exposure to
asbestos dust ("Tyler 2" actions), were brought between April
1978 and November 1979. The defendants had no place of
business in the United States, but NAAC, their wholly owned
American marketing subsidiary, incorporated in Illinois, had a
place of business there until 31 January 1978. Cape then promoted
a new Illinois corporation, CPC, whose shares were all owned by
the former chief executive of NAAC. In marketing asbestos in the
United States, neither NAAC, nor CPC, sold it for Cape or
Capasco, but brought the asbestos from Cape's South African
subsidiaries and resold it in the United States.
In a Texas federal district court, the plaintiffs were awarded
damages for personal injuries and consequential losses allegedly
suffered as a result of their exposure to asbestos fibres emitted
from a Texas factory. The plaintiffs contended that the defendants
failed to give direct or indirect proper warning of the dangers of
asbestos. The plaintiffs sought to enforce the unsatisfied Texas
judgement in English proceedings, but the Court of Appeal
dismissed the judgement for lack of jurisdiction and failure to
comport with the requirements of natural justice. The nebulous
test for the natural justice defence will be discussed in Part IV. In
relation to jurisdiction, Cape was "present" within the United
States via the subsidiary presence in Illinois, allowing jurisdiction
of the Texan court internationally. The Court of Appeal rejected
this argument since neither subsidiary, NAAC or CPC, had the
power to bind the defendants contractually, since it was prima
facie their own businesses and not possible to lift the corporate
veil, the principle of Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd.133 being
applied in the ordinary way. Additionally, the court rejected the
suggestion that where a group of companies forms an "economic
unit" it may be treated as one company. 134
After a lengthy examination of relevant authorities, Slade LJ
concluded that a company would be present in a foreign
jurisdiction if demonstrated that either servants at the corporation
carried on its business from a fixed place of business maintained by
the corporation or, alternatively, that a representative of the
corporation carried on the business of the corporation from a fixed
133. Salomon v. Salomon & Co., A.C. 22 (1897). The principle is that from the date of
incorporation the company is a legal entity separate from its members, who may deal with
it in the same way as outsiders.
134. Carter, supra note 123, at 404.
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place of business. 135 The difficulty, of course, with the English
Court of Appeal's review of the Texas court's jurisdictional
competence, and subsequent refusal to enforce their judgement, is
that it shows a flagrant disregard for principles of international
comity, commercial convenience, and free movement of
judgements. 136 A more efficacious model needs to be constructed.
2. Submission
The only alternative basis of international jurisdiction in the
eyes of English law is that of submission. The adjudicating foreign
court will be internationally competent if the defendant voluntarily
appears to defend the merits of the claim,137 or if a contract
provides that a foreign court is to have jurisdiction to settle a
dispute. Prior to section 33 of the Civil Jurisdiction and
Judgements Act 1982 it was implicitly determined in Henry v.
Geoprosco International138 that where a defendant had appeared
before the foreign court to ask it to stay the action, and remit it to
arbitration in accordance with an agreement between the parties,
he had thereby submitted. However, section 33 was enacted to
reverse such an assumption, and no submission will occur when the
defendant contends: (a) that the court has no jurisdiction, (b) that
he is seeking a stay or dismissal because the dispute should be
arbitrated or adjudged by the courts of another jurisdiction; or (c)
that his property should be protected from seizure in the
proceedings. 13
9
It is noteworthy that no express provision applies to the
defendant's voluntary challenge requesting the court not to allow
service on him out of the jurisdiction under the foreign equivalent
to Civil Procedure Rule 6.20 of the Civil Procedure Rules
(formerly order 11, rule 1(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court).
The preponderance of academic opinion would consider such a
contention as a submission, given the patent lacuna covering such
a challenge in Section 33(1)(b) of the 1982 Act. If, as some foreign
135. Adams v. Cape Indus., 1 All E.R. 929, 1014 (Ch. 1991).
136. Id. at 1001-02. Their Lordships inclined to the view that presence in the United
STates alone would be sufficient. Id. at 1002.
137. See Murthy v. Sivajothi, 1 All E.R. 721,730 (1999).
138. Henry v. Geoprosco Int'l Ltd., Q.B. 726 (1976).
139. Indus. Maritime Carriers Inc. v. Sinoca Int'l Inc., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 552 (Q.B. 1996)
(finding that a counterclaim to obtain the release of property threatened with seizure did
not amount to a submission).
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laws require, it is incumbent upon a defendant to file possible
defences on the merits, whilst contesting jurisdiction, this does not
equate to submission-provided he does not actually argue on the
merits.140 If an unsuccessful challenge to jurisdiction is followed
by a defense on the merits, the defendant has submitted for section
33, whereas if the defendant thereafter decides not to contest the
merits and to let the action go by default, he has not submitted to
the jurisdiction for the purposes of section 33.141 As Kaye stresses,
the choice for the defendant is clear: in the latter case, risk his
assets in the judgement-state so as to preserve property elsewhere
against enforcement; or, in the former case, try to safeguard
judgement-state assets, but, in the process, risk rendering property
elsewhere open to enforcement proceedings or losing the
defense.1
42
A defendant who expressly agrees to invoke the jurisdiction
of state A will have submitted, even where he fails to appear and
judgement is entered in default. For example, a foreign company's
taking of shares on the contractual basis that disputes over
membership be referred to a specific foreign court will amount to
the shareholder's submission to that foreign court.143 Agreement
to submit to a specific court in state A is not tantamount to
submission to all courts within that state.144 Additionally, any
written agreement to submit must be expressly made and cannot
be implied.
145
Jurisdictional competence of the foreign court is, thus, strictly
circumscribed in the chauvinistic eyes of traditional English
common law. Apart from presence and submission, no other bases
of jurisdiction will suffice: nationality of the parties; suitability of
forum; place of accrual of the cause of action; the fact an English
140. Marc Rich & Co. AG v. Societa Italiana Impianti PA (No. 2) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 624,
633 (1992).
141. Peter Kaye, Forensic Submission as a Bar to Arbitration, 12 CIV. JUST. Q. 359, 366
(1993).
142. Id.
143. Copin v. Adamson, 1 Ex. D. 17 (1875).
144. S.A. Consortium Gen. Textiles v. Sun & Sand Agencies Ltd., 1 Q.B. 279, 281
(C.A. 1978) (Goff & Shaw L.JJ.). It will be a matter of construction as to whether the
submission through contractual agreement isto courts generally, or to a specific court. If
the latter and the claim is brought in a different court within State A, then the contractual
clause does not constitute submission, but the defendant's voluntary appearance may be if
challenge is to the merits.
145. Id.
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court would have itself taken jurisdiction upon similar facts;146 and
foreign equivalents of service of a claim form out of the
jurisdiction are all rendered nugatory as bases of international
competence. There is a lack of rationality between the
appropriateness of venue test that now governs arrogation of in
personam jurisdiction of an English court and the antediluvian
rationale, rooted in nineteenth century concepts, that continue to
prevail on the issue of jurisdictional competence.
III. A NEW MODEL OF JURISDICTIONAL PROPRIETY
If an international order lacking a supranational administration
of justice is to be reasonably efficient and just, plaintiffs must be
able to select a forum for litigation without according, in the
general run of cases, decisive weight to whether the resulting
judgement can, as practical matter, be enforced locally.... In
the final analysis, rules and practices respecting the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgements should serve the same
purposes as rules and practices respecting choice of law and the
assumption of adjudicatory jurisdiction; they should foster
stability and coherence in an inchoate international order where
many aspects of life are not fully contained within any single
State, but the administration of justice remains the charge of
individual States.
147
It is submitted that the present Anglo-American tests for
recognising foreign judgements need to be reformulated. The
current law appears hopelessly anachronistic, and rationalisation is
needed, as Harris has previously suggested, to show deference to
foreign courts, in the name of comity, consistency and
convenience. 148 English law presently recognises only two forms
of jurisdiction as "proper" in an international sense, namely, the
"presence of the defendant in the territory of the originating state
when the action was commenced or the defendant's consent-by
taking part in the proceedings or by previous agreement-to the
courts of that state exercising jurisdiction over the defendant.
149
146. Schibsby v. Westenholz, 6 Eng. Rep. 155, 159 (Q.B. 1870).
147. Arthur T. Von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgements-
General Theory and the Role of Jurisdictional Requirements, 167 Recueil Des Cours 9, at
360 (1981).
148. Harris, supra note 40, at 482.
149. Joost Blom, The Enforcement Of Foreign Judgements: Morguard Goes Forth Into
The World, 28 CAN. Bus. L.J. 373,376 (1997).
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Moreover, the law on recognition of foreign judgements needs to
be integrated more closely into private international law.150 The
disparity in English law was heightened by the appellate decision
in Adams v. Cape Industries, which drew a chasm between the
common law principles that determine the English court's
jurisdiction and those which, at the enforcement stage, determine
whether a foreign court is to be regarded as a court of competent
jurisdiction.
As for U.S. law, with some high profile exceptions, 151 U.S.
courts have taken a liberal stance on the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgements, but are clearly showing
frustration that other states have not reciprocated in equal
measure. 152 At present, U.S. law is something of a smorgasbord
with competing and varied state recognition principles dependent
upon reciprocity, obligation, comity, the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgements Recognition Act, or a combination of each of these.15
3
In truth, "there emerges no 'American Rule' for the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgements, but rather a crazy quilt
arrangement of methods for their domestication.'1 5
4
An appropriate Anglo-American theoretical test for
jurisdictional propriety twins together jurisdictional and
recognition rules as one integrated process. Moreover, it is
necessary to create freer movement of judgements at common law,
which is arguably more appropriate for the modern world. There
should be a realisation that, "in the twenty-first century the
number of countries in which litigation may "belong" but in whose
courts the quality of the judicial process would make us uneasy is
small. ' 155 No doubt, the amount of respect we have for a
particular foreign legal system is contingent on our familiarity with
150. Briggs, Which Foreign Judgements?, supra note 46, at 240; Borchers, supra note,
117, at 128.
151. See supra Part IV for discussion of foreign libel judgements and non-enforcement
in the United States.
152. Fastiff, supra note 31, at476.
153. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgements, supra note 32,
at 271 (1994); Andreas Lowenfeld, Thoughts About Multinational Judgements Convention:
A Reaction to the Von Mehren Report, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (1994).
154. Woodward, supra note 10, at 305.
155. J. D. MCLEAN & K. W. PATCHET'T, THE RECOGNITON AND ENFORCEMENT OF
JUDGEMENTS AND ORDERS AND THE SERVICE OF PROCESS WITHIN THE
COMMONWEALTH, art. 263 (Commonwealth Secretariat, Marlborough House London).
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it and on the degree of trust and confidence that we repose in it.
156
Indeed, it has been argued that this distrust is particularly acute in
the context of the relationship between developing and developed
nations. 157
The solution propounded herein would bridge this perceived
ethnocentric gap. In essence, the cornerstone to extending
recognition rules is "international harmony, and commercial
practicality, not the fact that different states share similar bases for
taking of jurisdiction." 15 8 Any new test needs to be dynamic, so
that it can preserve the possibility of altering the scope of the
recognition rules in a changing world. As von Mehren has stated,
"an effort to state exhaustively the bases upon which jurisdiction
can be asserted is stultifying and prevents changes in jurisdictional
practice that may be needed to take into account future legal or
economic developments.' 159 A modern solution allows each legal
system to tailor its rules concerning recognition of foreign
judgements to the needs of the day.
160
A vital starting point in the move towards a new recognition
and enforcement test, dynamic in nature, and promoting
jurisdictional propriety, was provided by the striking contribution
of the Supreme Court of Canada in Morguard Investments Ltd. v.
De Savoye.161 Although the case itself was concerned with inter-
provincial recognition in Canada, the adopted approach has been
discussed to the recognition and enforcement of common law
judgements granted outside Canada.162 A defendant served out of
the jurisdiction of Alberta, let judgement against him go by
default. As he had never been present within Alberta, nor had
submitted to the jurisdiction of the Albertan court, he resisted
enforcement of the judgement against him in British Columbia.
Traditional common law principles under Adams v. Cape
156. Michael Quilling, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Country
Judgements and Arbitral Awards: North-South Perspective, 11 GA. J. INT. & COMP. L. 635,
638 (1981).
157. Id.
158. Harris, supra note 40, at 483.
159. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of F6reign Judgements, supra note 32,
at 281.
160. Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, 76 D.L.R. 4th 256, 273 (1990); see
Symposium, Recognition of Extraprovincial and Foreign Judgements: The Implications of
Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, 22 CAN. BUS. L.J. 2 (1993).
161. Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, 76 D.L.R. 4th 256,273 (1990).
162. Id. at 270.
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Industries would not have obligated him by the Albertan
judgement. The Supreme Court of Canada, however, took the
contrary view. The court found that the Albertan court had taken
jurisdiction in an appropriate manner upon the facts; its judgement
was therefore entitled to recognition. The court possessed a real
and substantial connection with the action brought before it and
was therefore entitled to be jurisdictionally competent. 163 The
Morguard test provides a much more flexible test than that under
traditional Anglo-American principles, and may be met in the
situation where the defendant neither resided in the judgement-
granting state nor submitted to its courts.164  The approach
promoted international harmony and universality in that it was not
concerned solely with Canadian federalism, but more generously
with, "the need in modern times to facilitate the flow of wealth,
skills and people across state lines in a fair and orderly manner."
165
It is instructive to look further at the rationale behind both
the Morguard decision and the merits or otherwise of the "real and
substantial connection test" taking centre-stage as a theoretical
policy basis. First, the decision declared that the notion of comity
would, moving forward, provide the touchstone for Canadian
private international law. Although the court, through La Forest
J., spoke as if this orientation was well-established, no Canadian
court in modern times had put comity at the epicentre, as "the
informing principle of private international law."'166 Prior to the
decision, as Blom cogently identifies, the courts saw comity as
unhelpful either as a justification or guide for private international
law. The underlying premise for this conceptual misapprehension
was that it was "grounded in the idea of the voluntary deference
that a sovereign, or the sovereign court's, chose to pay to the
courts of another sovereign." That pre-conception made it
difficult, if not impossible, to extrapolate any definite test as to
when comity should yield to the sovereign's self-interest and vice-
versa. The Morguard Court, however, held that, "the real nature
of ... comity [is] an idea based not simply on respect for the
dictates of a foreign sovereign, but on the convenience, nay
necessity, in a world where legal authority is divided among
163. Id. at 277.
164. Id. at 274.
165. Id. at 269.
166. Id. at 270.
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sovereign states of adopting a doctrine of this kind." 167  That
doctrine, La Forest J. articulated, was reflected in rules of private
international law that were "grounded in the need in modern times
to facilitate the flow of wealth, skills and people across state lines
in a fair and orderly manner. What must underlie a modern
system of private international law are principles of order and
fairness, principles that ensure security of transactions with
justice." 1
68
Furthermore, the decision in Morguard stressed that the
"modem conditions of international commerce and the movement
of people were directly relevant to determining the appropriate
response of conflict of laws to particular issues, such as the
enforcement of monetary judgements."'169 Subsequently, in Hunt
v. T & N, the court "made it clear that the [appropriate manner] to
decide whether an assumption of jurisdiction was proper was "not
a mechanical counting of contacts or connections" but a decision
guided by the requirements of order and faimess."'170 The
practical impact of this new governing test, as extended to
international cases, was that a defendant who received notice that
they were being sued in any Canadian court, or before a foreign
court, would ex necessitate have to defend the action therein. An
unpalatable alternative was the default judgement, enforceable in
the defendant's home territory under Morguard with no domestic
avenue to defend the claim on the merits.171 The implication of
the Morguard judgement is that the old common law recognition
rules were based on a view of the world subject to discreditation,
that much freer movement of judgements was required, and that
the development of a world economy demanded reappraisal of the
rules. 17
2
Although there is much to be carried forward from the
Morguard decision, the demerit of the test originates from the
flexibility in La Forest J.'s phrase, "order and fairness," as well as
the nebulousness of "a real and substantial connection" model.
The Morguard decision holds a foreign judgement is enforceable
provided the defendant is not treated unjustly. The unjustness
167. Id. at 268; Blom, supra note 149, at 373-75.
168. Morguard Investments, 76 D.L.R. 4th at 269; Blom, supra note 149, at 375.
169. Biom, supra note 149, at 375.
170. 109 D.L.R. 4th 16, at 42 (1993).
171. Blom, supra note 149, at 381.
172. Id.
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question is answered by examining whether the judgement
originating court was a natural or appropriate forum in that it
meets the criteria of real and substantial connection-cum-order
and fairness test.173 This appears nebulous in opening up a
limitless array of variables. 174  The difficulty, as Blom has
identified, is in leaving "order and fairness" to a solipsistic, case-
by-case evaluation. 175 It smacks of ad-hocery. The limitless vista
of variables may encompass such factors as the language and
traditions of the foreign legal system, the organisation of the local
bar, the nature of the plaintiff's claim, the geographical situation of
the foreign court, and the content of the relevant foreign law.176
In reality, the current structure of Canadian law will have to
develop incrementally those foreign judgements binding on
Canadian defendants, as distinct from a minority that are not. The
theoretical tools for squaring this circle on recognition and
enforcement are the real and substantial connection-cum-order
and fairness test, operating in tandem with the various common
law defences to the enforcement of foreign judgements which,
prima facie, take on new significance in the post-Morguard new
legal order.
There are also a number of policy considerations in an
optimal Anglo-American test for foreign judgement recognition:
interests of finality in judgements; conservation of judicial
resources and certainty in the process; preclusion; and sufficient
flexibility to allow our recognition rules to evolve with
contemporary conditions. A balance needs to be struck between
certainty and flexibility. A negative of the Morguard approach is
the open-textured result that is produced and the uncertainty of
the test is exponentially greater in the international rather than the
inter-provincial sphere.
Comity has a vital role to play in the overall structure of the
new model, embodying concerns of both an international nature
and of the individual parties. Comity principles reveal a beneficial
deference to foreign courts, and fulfillment of the criterion
described as "the need to become more tolerant of the systems of
173. Id. at 383.
174. Id.; see Black & Swan, New Rules for the Enforcement of Foreign Judgements:
Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, 12 ADV. Q. 489, 508-09 (1990).
175. Blom, supra note 149, at 383.
176. Id.
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other countries." 177 The exact constituents of comity requirements
may be shifted to meet the needs of a new world order within the
overall framework as defined. 178 A twin model is thus suggested.
First, a presumption of recognition should apply with a rebuttable
presumption of jurisdictional competence of a foreign court in the
view of Anglo-American law.179 Second, it should be incumbent
on the defendant, a reversal of the existing burden, to show that it
would be unjust to accord jurisdictional competence to the
originating court, and to recognise or enforce the judgement.
180
As propounded, this new test would arguably provide a legitimate
and effective counter-balance between the scylla of due deference
to the foreign legal system and commercial practicality on one side
of the scales, and charybdis of the judgement debtor's concerns on
the other. 181 This new test put forward begs the question: When
does unjustness to the defendant occur to tip the scales, and on
what predicate does it become operable?
Morguard's answer looked to whether the judgement
originating court was a natural or appropriate forum in that it
meets the criteria of the real and substantial connection-cum-order
and fairness test. As identified there are certain problems with
this approach. The test of appropriateness is fundamentally open-
textured and turns on the exercise of the court's discretion.
A more restrictive test is therefore preferred. At the outset of
this section, it was stated that the reformulated test needed to
integrate more effectively the jurisdictional rules with foreign
judgements recognition. The threshold for a defendant's effective
challenge to the jurisdictional competence of a foreign court
should equate to the unconscionability standard over restraint of
foreign proceedings. 182  Anglo-American courts, in certain
circumstances, may grant an injunction restraining a party from
177. Amchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Worker's Compensation Board), 102
DLR (4th) 96,104 (1993).
178. Harris, supra note 40, at 482.
179. Id. at 484.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See generally Stephen Males, Comity and Anit-Suit Injunctions, 1998 LLOYD'S
MAR. & COM. L. W. 543; Trevor Hartley, Comity and the Use of Antisuit Injunctions in
International Litigation, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 48 (1987). In relation to powers of the English
High Court in respect of injunctions, see the Supreme Court Act 1981, s. 37.
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commencing or continuing as claimant in foreign proceedings. 183
They will only be persuaded by a party to the litigation dispute so
to act in limited cases.
The rationale for this restrictive perspective concerns
international comity. Although the claim form is directed at the
individual, there is still an implicit interference with the foreign
court's jurisdiction whenever an Anglo-American court grants an
injunction restraining foreign proceedings. There are intrinsic
comity problems attached to the exercise of the power to restrain
foreign proceedings, and these impacted concerns have led to the
discretionary power being cautiously exercised. 184 In a similar
vein, refusal to recognise or enforce a foreign judgement also
impinges on international comity as it can denigrate the processes
of the foreign legal system. Caution should also be exercised in
this regard. The extant position under English law, however, is
that an anti-suit injunction will not be granted in circumstances
which amount to a breach of comity. 185
The advantage of the unconscionability test is that it presents
a high hurdle for a party to step over, and consequently will
promote free movement of judgements, whilst allowing
discretionary flexibility to meet rare cases of unjustness. The clear
merit of the test is that it sends a significant message that goes to
the very core of judgement recognition on an international playing
field-it provides the claimant with an enforceable judgement
provided that the defendant is not treated unjustly. It will not be
easy to persuade the court that there has been unconscionable
conduct. The English common law decisions in South Carolina
Insurance Co. v. Assurantie NV186 and Midland Bank v. Laker
Airways Ltd.187 provide an interesting comparison, and point of
reference, for demarcating the constituents of unconscionability.
183. See BRIGGS AND REES, supra note 115, at 239; Richard Fentiman, Current Issues
in Int'l Commercial Litigation (ed. Cheong et al) at 44-71.
184. See, e.g., British Airways Board v. Laker Airwys Ltd., 1 A.C. 58, 95 (H.L. 1985);
Socirt6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. Jak, 1 A.C. 871, 878 (P.C. 1987) (appeal
taken from Brunei).
185. As a general rule, before an anti-suit injunction can properly be granted by an
English court to restrain a person from pursuing proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction in
cases of the kind under consideration in the present case, comity requires that the English
forum should have a sufficient interest in, or connection with, the matter in question to
justify the indirect interference with the foreign court which an anti-suit injunction entails.
Airbus Indus. G.I.E. v. Patel, 1 A.C. 119, at 138 (1999).
186. 1 A.C. 24 (H.L. 1987).
187. 1 Q.B. 689 (1986).
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In the South Carolina case, a party to an English action
sought to obtain discovery of documents from a third party in the
United States. English procedure refuses this evidence to be
obtained whilst it is permissible in U.S. pre-trial proceedings. The
House of Lords determined that there was no unconscionable
conduct as there was no interference with the due process of the
English courts. Moreover, the English courts were still masters of
their own procedure as it was incumbent upon the parties to
obtain, either in England or abroad, the relevant evidence. 188 The
simple fact that extra cost and inconvenience to the respective
parties was implicated could not be characterised as interference
with the court's control of its own process. 189
A different outcome occurred in Midland Bank, where the
English Court of Appeal held that it was unconscionable conduct
for Laker to bring an anti-trust suit in the United States against the
Midland Bank and an injunction was therefore permissible to
restrain those threatened proceedings. What was the policy
rationale for this significant determination? In essence, the
appellate court asserted that the bank had never submitted to U.S.
anti-trust law or U.S. jurisdiction; there was no claim against it in
England; and the alleged liability of the Bank arose out of banking
acts done in England and intended to be governed by English
law.190 As in South Carolina, the exposure of a party to U.S. pre-
trial discovery proceedings is not prima facie to be viewed as
unjust or unconscionable. In exceptional cases such as Midland
Bank Plc., where it is palpably obvious that the action abroad is
bound to fail, the claimant's foreign action will per se be
stigmatised as unconscionable, as being frivolous and vexatious.
191
The optimal dual test propounded presumes in favour of
foreign judgement recognition, but reverses the burden on the
defendant to demonstrate to the English court that enforceability
is unjust, in the sense of unconscionability, thereby replicating the
jurisdictional test for restraint of foreign proceedings. The efficacy
of this model can be illustrated through the following hypothetical,
188. 1 A.C. 24,41-43 (H.L.1987).
189. Id. at 42-43.
190. Midland Bank v. Laker Airways, 1 Q.B. 689, 700, 712-13 (1986). Another cogent
factor was that the evidence of conspiracy under U.S. law was unsubstantiated, although
the court hesitated to evaluate the overall weight of evidence in depth at the point of the
anti-suit application. Id. at 698.
191. 1 Q.B. 689, 700-02, 712-13 (1986).
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a slight variant of that expertly presented by Briggs, concerning a
defendant against whom an action is brought in a foreign country.
Let us suppose that X Ltd., a car manufacturer based in England,
exports some of their products to Ontario, Canada, and through a
succession of sales one of them ends up in the U.S. state of
Virginia. Through a latent defect such as a defectively
manufactured petrol pump system, the vehicle explodes in use and
seriously injures a local Virginian resident. Suppose too that the
Virginian sues the English manufacturer in Virginia. By applying
traditional common law principles, unless the defendant is
resident/present at the time of the originating process of the
foreign courts, or alternatively submits to jurisdiction, then they
may "cock a snook" at the Virginian proceedings. This solicitude
in favour of the defendant defies rationalization. In this
illustration, if an English court were to deny recognition to the
Virginian judgement, even if Virginia were an appropriate forum
for the litigation (local resident suing for harm negligently inflicted
in home state), it still does not prevent the Virginia action from
proceeding. The corollary of this is that the defendant's decision
whether to appear to defend the merits will have to reflect the fact
that if he suffers judgement against him, it precludes him from
simply moving assets to Virginia. This probably will be of no
concern to the English car manufacturer defendant because under
pre-existing English common law principles on jurisdictional
competence of a foreign court, his domestic assets are protected. 192
A different, more efficacious outcome, results under the
suggested new model for Anglo-American foreign judgement
recognition. The foreign Virginian judgement and jurisdiction
would be presumptively valid and enforceable through the eyes of
the foreign adjudicating court. No longer would the scales be
skewed in favour of the defendants' solicitude. By reversing the
burden on the defendant, X Ltd. would be swimming against the
tide in raising an unjustness argument. If the claimant has brought
proceedings in a presumptively valid foreign court, which is not an
inappropriate forum to resolve the dispute, what substantial
justification can there be for denying him recognition of his
judgement? There are legitimate interests of the claimant that
should be crystallised by adopting the dual model propounded.
192. See Briggs, Which Foreign Judgements?, supra note 46, at 254-56 (where this
hypothetical situation is cogently identified and evaluated).
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Also, the optimal solution will promote more obedience to foreign
judgements in that fewer will now be denied recognition. An
effective balance is struck between the policy concerns of certainty
and flexibility.
Discretion is also built in to the system through the applicable
defences to recognition of foreign judgements, but it is argued that
any equitable system of recognition must provide fluid
exceptions. 193 Defences to recognition will protect the legitimate
interest of the defendant who received inadequate notice of
proceedings, who had no opportunity to appear, or against whom
the judgement was procured by fraud, or, if for some other reason,
its recognition would be contrary to public policy. The scales are
appropriately balanced between the legitimate interests of
claimant and defendant, with a beneficial realignment of the rules
on jurisdictional touchstones and jurisdictional competence in
international disputes. We now focus our attention to the
reformulated optimal tests for the defences, predicated on the
grounds of public policy, fraud, and natural justice.
IV. DEFENCES To RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGEMENTS: NEW OPTIMAL TESTS
A. Present Anglo-American Public Policy Defenses
The public policy exception is an essential political tool to
encourage reluctant member states to join the Hague
Convention because it serves as a 'safety valve' for
unforeseeable changes in the law.... In fact, the inclusion of
the public policy exception in the Brussels Convention was
'excused, on the ground that it was seen to be an essential
'safety-valve', which would facilitate ratification of the
Convention by Member States, jealous of preserving existing
fundamental controls on recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgements.' It may be better to include a mechanism
where a member state may 'base refusal of [enforcement and
recognition of a foreign judgement] upon a Convention
provision, however vague [rather] than 'deliberately... violate
the text of an international treaty.' Consequently, the public
policy exception is an absolutely necessary political measure to
193. Id. at 256.
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the adoption of the Hague Convention because it counters the
fears of recalcitrant countries.
194
The public policy defence impinges upon state rather than
individuated concerns, providing a limited discretionary role in the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements. In general,
U.S. courts have exhibited a tendency towards enforcing foreign
judgements liberally, which would not normally be awarded in an
intra-state context. 195 On both sides of the Atlantic, the public
policy exception has been applied solicitously and rarely. One
exception is provided by the recent U.S. state courts' refusal to
accept English libel judgements. 196 The deleterious consequences
of the misuse of this defence are evaluated in the following sub-
section and a new test is proposed to reflect the legitimate ambit of
this "safety-valve."
In Hilton v. Guyot, the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that
it would not recognize a foreign judgement if doing so would
contravene U.S. public policy. 197 The public policy exception,
however, is not very well-defined. Although U.S. courts have
uniformly exempted themselves from recognizing or enforcing a
foreign judgement that contravenes state public policy, they have
seldom actually denied recognition or enforcement. A notable
aspect is that different policies or procedures within the foreign
and U.S. forums will not necessarily trigger public policy concerns
and deny recognition or enforcement. 198 The standard for denying
194. Karen E. Minehan, The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign
Judgements: Necessary or Nemesis?, 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 795, 817-18
(1996).
195. Note that the proposed Hague Convention is not likely to cover the following
areas of law, where U.S. courts have applied the public policy exception: Overseas Inns
S.A. P.A. v. United States, 685 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (tax assessment); Laker
Airways Ltd v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (antitrust);
and Barry E. v. Ingraham, 371 N.E. 2d 492 (N.Y. 1977) (adoption).
196. Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d. 230, 249 (Md. 1997). But see Robert L.
Spellman, Spitting in the Queen's Soup: Refusal of American Courts to Enforce Foreign
Libel Judgements, 16 COMM. & L. 63 (1994).
197. Hilton v. Guyot, 592 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1895). But see Adamsen v. Adamsen, 195
A.2d 418 (1963); Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 443
(3rd Cir. 1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
198. See Somportex, 453 F.2d at 443 (enforcing English judgement even though
substantial portion was for compensatory damages for loss of goodwill and for attorney
fees items or which Pennsylvania law did not allow recovery); Neporany v. Kir, 5 A.D. 2d
438, 173 N.Y.S. 2d 146 (App. Div. 1958) (enforcing Quebec judgement for seduction and
criminal conversation even though similar actions had been abolished in New York);
Compania Mexicanca Radiodifusora Franteriza v. Spann, 41 F. Supp. 907, 909 (N.D. Tex.
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recognition is high and can only be invoked in clear-cut cases. 199
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Somportex Ltd.
found grounds to deny enforcement when it "tends clearly to
injure the public health, the public morals, the public confidence in
the purity of the administration of the law, or to undermine that
sense of security for individual rights, whether of personal liberty
or of private property." 200  A forum will estop a party from
attacking a judgement on public policy grounds if that party
initiated the foreign proceedings, unless the enforcing forum
perceives an interest in the action besides protecting the litigant.
20 1
Liberal foreign judgement recognition frequently occurs in
U.S. courts. The fact that a judgement obtained abroad could not
have been obtained domestically, or that a cause of action pursued
abroad could not be invoked in U.S. jurisdiction is insufficient to
deny enforcement on public policy grounds.20 2 In Neporany v.
Kir,203 for example, the New York Appellate Division supported
the enforcement of a Canadian judgement for seduction because
"our public policy is not contravened by the enforcement of a
money judgement arising from causes of action proscribed by
Article 2-A, but which are recognized in the jurisdiction where the
acts took place." 204  Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. Collins, the
Texas Supreme Court enforced a Mexican judgement in a
negligence action that included damages for moral reparations and
injuries to plaintiff's "reputation, dignity or honor," even though
such a cause of action did not exist under Texan law.20 5 The court
determined that "the mere fact that these aspects of the law differ
1941), aff'd 131 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1942) (awarding costs and attorney fees against
unsuccessful plaintiff in Mexican action notwithstanding fact that they would not be
granted by the enforcing forum in similar circumstance).
199. U.S. courts have applied the public policy defence with laudable caution and
solicitude. A blot on the landscape, however, is the recent treatment of English libel
judgements. Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, 585 N.Y.S. 2d 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1992); Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d. 230, 249 (Md. 1997); Ackerman v. Levine, 788
F.2d 830, at 841 (2d Cir. 1986).
200. Somportex Ltd., 453 F.2d at 443 (citing Goodyear v. Brown, 115 Pa. 514, 515
(1893)).
201. Note that this rule has generally been applied in divorce recognition cases. See,
e.g., Perrin v. Perrin, 408 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1969); Unruh v. Indus. Comm'n, 301 P.2d 1029
(1956); Rediker v. Rediker, 221 P.2d 1 (1950).
202. Minehan, supra note 194, at 804; Knothe v. Rose, 392 S.E. 2d 570 (Ga. Ct. App.
1990).
203. Neporany v. Kir, 173 N.Y.S. 2d 146 (App. Div. 1958).
204. Id. at 148.
205. Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W. 2d 312, 321-22 (Tex. 1979).
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from ours does not render them violative of public policy" and that
"there is nothing in the substance of these laws inimical to good
morals, natural justice, or the general interests of the citizens of
this state." 20
6
Although the Uniform Recognition Act covers most
differences in law, it is vital to narrow the public policy exception
for concerns over international comity, certainty in judgements,
and international co-operation. Otherwise any differences in law
could fall within this catch-all loophole:
As commerce becomes increasingly international in character, it
is essential that businessmen recognize and respect the laws of
those foreign nations in which they do business. They cannot
expect foreign tribunals to have one set of laws for their own
citizens and another, more favorable, set for the citizens of
other countries. It is also essential that American courts
recognize and respect the judgements entered by foreign courts
to the greatest extent consistent with our own ideals of justice
and fair play. Unfettered trade, good will among nations, and a
vigorous and stable international-and national-economy
demand no less.2
07
In truth, principles of international comity, deference to
foreign legal systems, and res judicata demand a limited reading of
the public policy defence. Forums should avoid being unduly
sensitive to imagined superior judicial processes or substantive
enactments at a state level. Interestingly, U.S. courts have been
called upon to examine the limited public policy exception in a far
wider variety of situations than their English counterparts. U.S.
courts have enforced foreign default judgements. The high-water
mark case is that of Tahan v. Hodgson, where the Appellate Court
of the District of Columbia upheld an Israeli default judgement
that a U.S. court would not have awarded. 20 8 As Minehan
identified, a U.S. court would refrain enforcing an Israeli
judgement for two reasons. 209 First, "the Israeli court entered a
default judgement based on Israeli notice requirements which are
inconsistent with U.S. notice requirements. '" 21.0  Second, by
piercing the corporate veil and entering a judgement against the
206. 583 S.W. 2d 312,322 (Tex. 1979).
207. Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
208. Id.; Minehan, supra note 194, at 802.
209. Tahan, 662 F.2d at 868.
210. Id. at 867; Minehan, supra note 194, at 802-03.
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defendant, the Israeli court violated U.S. public policy." 21' The
Tahan court found that Israeli notice requirements are not so
''repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just" that
U.S. public policy requires non-enforcement of the Israeli
judgement.212 The court articulated that because the defendant
was capable of, but chose not to, appear and present a viable
defence in the Israeli court, he could not "fail to contest the Israeli
plaintiff and then declare that he would have won." 213 The court
held that the Israeli court did not act repugnantly when it decided
to pierce the corporate veil, particularly since the defendant did
not present a case in the Israeli action.
214
Situations where U.S. courts enforce prejudgement interest
awards, even where local law reviles such awards, illustrate
another example of how the United States have adopted a
generally constrained public policy defence. In Ingersoll Milling
Machine Co. v. Granger, the appellate court enforced a Belgian
judgement that embraced prejudgement interest. 215 The court
determined that, "the mere fact that Belgian law permits
prejudgement interest while Illinois law might not is not fatal to
the Belgian award. '216  The Ingersoll court followed the
perspective adduced in Hunt v. B.P. Exploration Co., where a
Texas district court enforced an English judgement including
prejudgement interest.217 Despite the state law's prohibition on
prejudgement interest, the court found that this delineation, in an
international context, did not violate "good morals and natural
justice" as to fall within the public policy exception.218 Local law
concerns significantly vary from those required in an international
setting.
In some cases where courts find public policy violations, there
is some forum interest greater than merely protecting the litigant.
Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines illustrates how
211. Tahan, 662 F.2d at 867.
212. Id at 866; Minehan, supra note 194, at 802-03.
213. Tahan, 662 F.2d at 867.
214. Id.; Minehan, supra note 194, at 802-03.
215. Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d. 680, 691 (7th Cir. 1987).
216. Id.
217. Hunt v. BP Exploration Co., 492 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Minehan, supra
note 194, at 802.
218. Hunt, 492 F. Supp. at 901.
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states' interests impact public policy concerns. 219 The litigation
arose out of Laker's antitrust suit against numerous other airlines,
originally filed in the U.S. courts. Certain British airlines
defendants responded by filing suit in the British courts, seeking
an injunction preventing Laker from pursuing its claims against
them in the U.S. courts. 220 The British court ultimately granted
the injunction. However, in the interim, Laker filed an action in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia seeking an
anti-suit injunction which would prevent the remaining defendant
airlines from seeking injunctions against Laker in the British
courts. Laker contended that the egregious price-fixing behavior
forced them out of business. The D.C. District Court granted the
injunction and the defendants appealed. 221 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit subsequently held
that the injunction was warranted on public policy grounds.
222
The court recognized the foreign judgement, but determined
that the public policy concerns behind issuing an anti-suit
injunction were the same as those behind nonrecognition of
foreign judgements. This, of course, mirrors the jurisdictional and
propriety test and the optimal new model suggested in Part III of
this Article. The court in Laker Airways, as Pittman has
identified, "specifically held that the forum has a great interest in
seeing that its important public policies are not evaded. '223 The
court then determined that "the defendants in this case were
attempting to escape application of the antitrust laws to their
conduct of business here in the United States. Since the antitrust
laws were of admitted economic importance to the United States,
the court held that U.S. interest and, hence, public policy,
mandated issuance of the anti-suit injunction." 224 In this limited
sphere, state interests legitimately prevailed over foreign
recognition.
219. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airways, 731 F.2d 909, 918 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 919.
222. Id. at 932; Pittman, supra note 61, at 992.
223. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 931; Pittman, supra note 61, at 992.
224. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 931; Pittman, supra note 61, at 992.
[Vol. 25:243
2003] Foreign Judgement Recognition and Enforcement 287
U.S. courts have also refused, on public policy grounds, to
enforce judgements that are penal in nature or involve taxation.
225
A Luxembourg judgement that calculated an insolvent company's
U.S. federal income tax debt at less than two hundred thousand
dollars, when the Internal Revenue Service claimed it was a
million dollars, was determined to violate the "inexpugnable
public policy that favors payment of lawfully owed federal income
taxes." 226  In general, however, U.S. courts have applied the
exception very narrowly (with the exception of foreign libel
judgements) because the other grounds for nonrecognition serve
adequately to protect the parties involved. The vital difference
with this defence, in contrast to others, is that it serves the forum-
recognizing interests and not individuated concerns. Thus, it is
entirely rationale that the defence should be limited in scope.
English courts will refuse to enforce foreign judgements that
are contrary to internal notions of public policy.227  The
predominant case law on public policy has been focused on family
law matters. For example, in Vervaeke v. Smith,228 it was
determined by the House of Lords that to recognise a Belgian
nullity decree invalidating a sham marriage, where the parties had
no intention of living together as husband and wife, would be
contrary to public policy.
Outside of the family law arena, it has been extremely
difficult to determine the ambit of the public policy doctrine.
229
Common examples usually stated include orders to pay damages
for breach of a contract to kidnap or contrary to fundamental
human rights. 230 In other areas a more liberal approach has been
applied, and exemplary damage awards, for instance, are
recognised as totally acceptable. In SA Consortium General
225. See Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 821 F. Supp. 292
(D.N.J. 1993). Note that some U.S. courts will also refuse to enforce foreign judgements
that relate to a wrongdoer's malfeasance.
226. Overseas Inns SA P.A. v. U.S., 685 F. Supp. 968,972 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
227. See generally Ottis Kahn-Freund, 39 Grotius Society 39 (1953); F.A. MANN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN ENGLISH COURTS Ch. 8.
228. 1 A.C. 145 (1983).
229. In Soleimany v. Soleimany, 3 W.L.R. 811, 821 (C.A. 1998) for example, there are
obiter dicta in the Court of Appeal to the effect that it would be against public policy to
recognise a foreign judgement enforcing a contract in the situation where the foreign court
has found as a fact that it was the common intention of the parties to commit an illegal act
in a state which England regards as a foreign and friendly state.
230. BRIGGS AND REES, supra note 115, at 265.
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Textiles v. Sun and Sand Agencies Ltd.,231 it was clearly stated by
Lord Denning that there was, "nothing contrary to English public
policy in enforcing a claim for exemplary damages, which is still
considered to be in accord with the public policy in the United
States and many of the great countries of the Commonwealth. '232
Certainly, it would be egregious to widely stigmatise foreign
judgements as contrary to internal concepts of English public
policy, and the famous statement of Justice Cardozo in Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co. of New York,233 seems particularly apposite as a
guiding standard:
We are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a
problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at
home .... The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign
right at the pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual notion
of expediency or fairness. They do not close their doors unless
help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some
prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted
tradition of the common weal.23 4
As with the American perspective on public policy, it is the
recognizing court's state interests that are impinged, not individual
party matters.
B. Public Policy Defense and the New Model
This Article has proposed a new optimal model of
jurisdictional propriety that is based upon international comity
theory combined with a certain test that integrates jurisdictional
rules more fully. It would be unfortunate if the beneficial effects
of this optimal solution were downplayed via overbroad use of the
public policy defence. International comity, as defined in
Morguard, also has a crucial role to play in determining the
legitimate ambit of any discretionary element in the process,
whether it be public policy, fraud or natural justice. In balancing
the public policy exception with the enforcement of foreign libel
judgements, for example, Judge Chasanow added his imprimatur
to the relevant policy debate:
231. SA Consortium General Textiles v. Sun and Sand Agencies Ltd., 1 Q.B. 279, 300
(1978).
232. Id.
233. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 22 N.Y. 99 (1918).
234. Id. at ill.
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Our interest in international goodwill, comity and res judicata
fostered by recognition of foreign judgements must be weighed
against our minimal interest in giving the benefits of our local
libel policy to residents of another country who defame foreign
public figures in foreign publications and who have no
reasonable expectation that they will be protected by the
Maryland constitution. Unless there is some United States
interest that should be protected, there is no good reason to
offend a friendly nation like England by refusing to recognize a
purely local libel judgement for a purely local defamation.
235
The apposite test for any public policy defence in libel is of
generic rationality. The public policy exception should be limited
to cases of serious injustice in which the original claim is repugnant
to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the
recognition forum. 236 The public policy defence, unlike natural
justice or fraud, is not rooted by individuated concerns but
properly operates to serve the interests of the state. Any
acceptable system on recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgements must leave some kind of "safety valve" for violation of
public policy. In article 28(1)-(f) of the Preliminary Draft of the
multilateral convention, there is a defence provided if "recognition
and enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with the public
policy of the State addressed. ' 237 Understandably, no definition is
provided on the constituents of "manifest incompatibility." What
is vital is that any convention, among states with basically shared
values, should contain a definition of public policy that is narrowly
drawn. From the analysis herein, enforcement should only be
denied where it "would violate the forum's state's most basic
notions of morality and justice."238 Public policy sets a limit on
acceptance of foreign laws and legal systems. The operable limit is
the duty of the enforcement court to protect the fundamental
social norms prevailing in the society in which enforcement is
sought.
235. Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d. 230,257 (Md. 1997).
236. Id at 255-56.
237. See Preliminary Draft Hague Judgements Convention, supra note 44.
238. Parsons & Whitlemore Overseas Co. v. Socidt6 Gdn~rale de l'Industrie du Papier,
508 F.2d. 969, 974 (2d. Cir. 1974).
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C. Fraud As A Defence: A Reappraisal
1. The English experience
In both a foreign judgement and an English judgement, a
defendant usually cannot ask the court to reopen the merits of the
case or put forward fresh evidence, unless it was not reasonably
discoverable at the time of the trial abroad, at which time it would
have altered the result.239 However, the one exception is fraud.
Fraud will unravel most things, and certainly unravels a foreign
judgement.240 Fraud has been defined as extending to incorporate,
"every variety of mala fides and mala praxis whereby one of the
parties misleads and deceives the judicial tribunal." 241
Abouloff v. Oppenheimer & Co. 242 and Vadala v. Lawes243
clearly established that a judgement debtor may defend himself in
England by showing that the judgement was obtained by fraud,
regardless of whether the foreign court already investigated the
alleged fraud. In England, a separate trial will investigate credible
allegations of fraud, even though it consequentially necessitates a
re-trial of the merits of the decision of the original court. Fraud, in
effect, drives a coach and horses through the policy favouring
conclusiveness of foreign judgements and finality of litigation. It
comports to the r~vision au fond doctrine under French law.
The ambit of the fraud defence is not restricted to the
preliminary requirement of fresh evidence which would be
required in a purely domestic case. As stated in Mcllkenny v.
Chief Constable of the West Midlands,244 a case involving perjury,
"where the issue at the first trial was which of two parties or their
witnesses was committing perjury, it was not sufficient to aver that
the judgement was obtained by perjury, since that is no more than
to say the decision ought to have gone the other way. There must
be sufficient fresh evidence to support the allegation." 245
239. Collier, supra note 53, at 441.
240. BRIGGS AND REES, supra note 115, at 262.
241. Jet Holdings v. Patel, 1 Q.B. 335, 347 (1990).
242. Abouloffv. Oppenheimer& Co., 10 Q.B.D. 295 (1882).
243. Vadala v. Lawes, 25 Q.B.D. 310 (1890). At issue here was a false claim by the
plaintiff that certain bills of exchange were mercantile when in reality they had been given
for gambling debts.
244. Mcllkenny v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands, 1 Q.B. 283 (1980).
245. Id. at 333.
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Moreover, Syal v. Heyward246 established that it does not matter
that the unsuccessful party in the foreign proceedings refrained
from raising the fraud defense in those proceedings, although the
facts were known to him at all material times. This laxity to
judgement debtors has been castigated as materially and illogically
prejudicing the finality of judgements. 247 Certainly it will be
viewed abroad as chauvinistic in that it supposes unfair results in
certain foreign jurisdictions. It is supported herein on the premise
that the fraud defence is of transcendent importance.
2. U.S. treatment of the fraud defence
A different rationale on the fraud defence is applied by U.S.
courts. In Hilton v. Guyot, the U.S. Supreme Court determined
that a foreign judgement is not entitled to recognition if the
judgement was procured by fraud.248 A delineation is made by
courts in the United States between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud.
On one side of the scales, if the fraud in procuring the foreign
judgement is intrinsic-that is, if the fraud is "related to matters
that were or could have been litigated ' 249 in the foreign
proceedings, then U.S. courts generally will recognise the foreign
judgement. 250 On the other side of the scales, if the fraud is
extrinsic-that is, "if the fraud deprives a party of an opportunity
to present adequately his claim or his defence," 251 then U.S. courts
will bar recognition of the foreign judgement.252 Moreover, as
Pittman states, "[a]t least one court held that extrinsic fraud must
also be a "fraud on the foreign court" in order to bar recognition
of the foreign judgement.
' '253
246. Syal v. Heyward, 2 K.B. 443 (1948).
247. See, e.g., CHESHIRE AND NORTH, supra note 53, at 444.
248. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 205 (1895); see Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia
Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 442 (3d Cir. 1971), cert denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972);
see generally von Mehren and Patterson, Foreign Country Judgments, supra note 66, at 59
(explaining that U.S. courts uniformly state that recognition of a foreign country
judgement will be denied if the judgement was procured by fraud).
249. Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Prometco (Produce & Metals) Co., 470 F.
Supp. 610, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (quoting Overmyer v. Eliot Realty, 83 Misc. 2d 694, 705,
371 N.Y.S. 2d 246,258 (1975)).
250. von Mehren and Patterson, Foreign Country Judgments, supra note 66, at 60.
251. R. Doak Bishop and Susan Burnette, United States Practice Concerning the
Recognition of Foreign Judgements, 16 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 425,434 (1982).
252. von Mehren and Patterson, Foreign Country Judgments, supra note 66, at 60.
253. Fairchild, 470 F. Supp. at 615; Pittman, supra note 61, at 980.
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The Uniform Recognition Act provides that a court may deny
recognition of a foreign judgement if the judgement was obtained
by fraud.254  This language has been construed by the
preponderance of courts in the United States to mean extrinsic
fraud. 255 The fraud provision of section 4(b) of the Uniform Act
has been substantially litigated. The decision in Bank of Nova
Scotia v. Tschabold Equipment Ltd.,256 demonstrates the court's
willingness to reject this argument for nonrecognition. Based on
the plaintiff's sworn statement that "this action is founded on a
contract executed in the Province of Alberta [Canada]" an Alberta
court entered an order allowing for service on the defendant in the
United States.257 The court exercised its long arm jurisdiction
pursuant to an Alberta Court Rule which allows service outside of
Alberta when "the proceeding is to enforce.., or otherwise affect
a contract.., made within Alberta." 25 8  Subsequently, at a
hearing, counsel for the plaintiff asserted some facts concerning an
indebtedness which later proved to be untrue.259 The Alberta
court ultimately entered a default judgement, and the plaintiff
sought enforcement of that judgement in a Washington state court.
In proceedings before the Washington Court, the defendant
stipulated that the statements by plaintiff's counsel concerning the
location of the contract's formation and the issue of indebtedness
were false and thus, that the judgement was obtained by fraud.260
The court rejected the fraud contention on two grounds:
First, the court contended that there exists different types of
fraud, and that, assuming the false statement concerning
indebtedness was in fact fraudulent, that is not the type of fraud
envisioned by the Uniform Act because such fraud involves the
merits of the case which could have been litigated. Second, the
court found no fraud in the false statement because they were
254. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgements Recognition Act, supra note 76, at
5.4(b)(2).
255. See, e.g., Fairchild, 470 F. Supp. at 615.
256. Bank of Nova Scotia v. Tschabold Equipment Ltd., 754 P. 2d 1290 (Wash. Ct.
App.).
257. Id at 1292.
258. Alberta Court Rule 30 (f)(i).
259. Bank of Nova Scotia, 754 P. 2d. at 1293.
260. Id. at 1294. Note that on appeal the defendant ultimately abandoned the
argument that the statement concerning formation of the contract constituted fraud,
conceding that it waived that argument by later appearing before the Alberta Court and
submitting to jurisdiction.
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not satisfied that the plaintiff deliberately made a false
statement to the court.
26 1
3. Fraud: A new conceptual model
In our new optimal model of jurisdictional propriety, the
fraud defence ought to be of transcendent importance. Fraud is
rightly regarded by English law as a particularly offensive matter,
distinct from other issues. The claimant who has obtained a
foreign judgement by fraud is not just a litigant who deliberately
caused the foreign court to come to a wrong decision. As Briggs
highlights, the general rule that foreign judgements are conclusive
as to their merits, even if the judgement is wrong, may justifiably
tend to increase the international enforceability of such
judgements; it does not follow that it should be extended to benefit
egregious claimants. 262 In essence, that the defendant should be
entitled to seek relief in relation to the quasi-tort is hardly
surprising, and that this requires a fresh examination of some of
the evidence is hardly surprising either.263
In a new model of jurisdictional propriety the fraud defence
has a vital role to play as an appropriate safety-valve. The
Preliminary Draft of the Multilateral Convention contains in
Article 28 (1)(e) a ground for refusal of, recognition, or
enforcement of a foreign judgement where: "the judgement was
obtained by fraud in a matter of procedure. '' 264 This is too
restrictive. There are two identifiable grounds for supporting the
widened view that prevails under English common law doctrine.265
Firstly, the fraudulent foreign judgement itself may be viewed as
the procurement of a chose in action by fraud.266 This judgement
itself can be equiparated with quasi-tort, the commission of the
tort completed at the moment the court is falsely induced to rule in
the plaintiff's favour, and not before that point.267 Hence, an
English recognizing court can logically rule on this quasi-tort.
Secondly, the defendant ought not to be limited to raising the
261. IL at 1294-95.
262. See Briggs, More Surprises, supra note 54, at 549.
263. AL
264. Preliminary Draft Hague Judgements Convention, supra note 44.
265. See Briggs, Brussels Convention, supra note 54, at 531; Briggs, More Surprises,
supra note 54, at 549.
266. Briggs, More Surprises, supra note 54, at 549.
267. Id.
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fraud issue before the court specifically chosen by the plaintiff.268
He ought to be entitled to have, "one post-judgement bite of the
cherry,"269 either in England or elsewhere, for the hearing of his
allegation. Such arguments seem logically compelling with fraud
operating as a panacea to curtail unmeritorious conduct by foreign
litigants.
No clearer distinction exists between the Brussels Convention
and common law principles on recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgements than the contextual treatment of the fraud
defence. In Interdesco S.A. v. Nullifire,27 ° Philips J. held that when
articles 27(1) and 34 of the Brussels Convention provide that a
judgement of an EC country shall not be recognised or enforced if
to do so would be contrary to public policy, including one obtained
by fraud. 271 Even when fresh evidence is adduced, the Abouloff
common law rule, he held, will be inapplicable. Axiomatically,
under the Convention, if the defendant has a means of redress in
the foreign courts, then the defendant must seek his remedy there.
Thus, fraud will hardly ever be a defence at the enforcement stage
in England.272 An unsatisfactory dividing line has, thus, been
created between EC and EFTA judgements on the one side of the
scales, and foreign judgements of the rest of the world on the
other.
A new Anglo-American reformulated defence of fraud needs
to demonstrate the link between taking jurisdiction and foreign
judgement recognition, treating the latter as the mirror image of
the former. The burden needs to be on the defendant to prove
fraud in the procurement of the foreign judgement by clear and
convincing evidence. An optimal model suggested is to adopt the
test of "good arguable case," as interpreted by the House of Lords
in Seaconsar Far East Ltd. v. Bank of Markazi Iran.273 This case
governs extended jurisdiction under the Civil Procedure Rules.
The supporting evidence must state the claimant's belief that the
claim has a reasonable prospect of success. 274 To satisfy an Anglo-
American court to re-open a foreign judgement on the ground of
268. Id. at 532.
269. BRIGGS AND REES, supra note 115, at 263.
270. Interdesco S.A. v. Nullifire, [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 180.
271. Collier, supra note 53, at 443.
272. Id.
273. Seaconsar Far East Ltd. v. Bank of Markazi Iran [1994] 1 AC 438.
274. English Civ. Pro. Rule 6.21 (1)(b).
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fraud, the defendant would need to establish a serious issue to be
tried on the merits. Also, the defendant would have to establish
that there is a substantial question of fact or law or both arising on
the facts disclosed by the written evidence that the defendant bona
fide desires to have tried.275 Criticism of the fraud defence,
namely that it unduly subverts the finality of judgements, and
shows an improper lack of respect for the competence of foreign
courts, may be tempered by a new test based on jurisdictional
propriety and certainty in application.
D. The Natural Justice Defence
1. U.S. general principles on natural justice
The traditional premise of Anglo-American judicial
experience is that a court will not recognise or enforce a foreign
judgement which was obtained in a manner contrary to natural
justice. The common starting point for mutual understanding of
the natural justice defence is that it requires two conditions to be
satisfied: first, the litigant must been have given notice of the
foreign proceedings; second, the litigant must have been given a
proper opportunity of presenting his case before the court.276 The
deficiency of either of these elements is an issue which should be
determined by the Anglo-American recognizing court, rather than
by the law of country of origin.
In Hilton v. Guyot, the U.S. Supreme Court demanded that
there be "due citation" of the defendant in a foreign action before
the judgement would be recognized by U.S. courts.277 This
requirement has subsequently been interpreted by domestic courts
to mean that the defendant must receive such notice of the foreign
action as would give him an opportunity to defend the action.278
As Pittman asserts, "this issue only arises in the case of default
judgements because a defendant's appearance in a foreign action is
conclusive proof of sufficient notice." 279 Moreover, although the
rule seems to be that "effective service of process" is required for
275. See Newcastle P & I v. V Ships, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 515 (1996); The Kurnia Dewi, 1
Lloyd's Rep. 552 (1997).
276. Jacobson v. Frachon, 138 L.T.R. 386, 392 (1927).
277. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 US 113,202 (1895); Pittman, supra note 61, at 978.
278. Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Pittman, supra note 61, at
978.
279. Pittman, supra note 61, at 978.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L Rev.
adequate notice,280 U.S. courts are preordained to determine the
issue "whether the defendant had actual notice and do not
generally consider the sufficiency of the foreign state's statutory
notice provisions." 281 Furthermore, service of process need not
comply with U.S. statutory notice provisions.282
Interestingly, U.S. courts established proper notice in the
form of proper service of process, and as a precondition to
recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgement.283  The
jurisprudence reveals that "proper service" has two possible
definitions. The first definition requires compliance with the
foreign country's statutory notice provisions.284 In the alternative
second definition, proper service is that which gives adequate
notice of the proceedings.285 A very limited number of cases have
claimed a lack of opportunity to be heard. In the event that the
court determines service to be proper and the defendant is
represented by counsel, later arguments about that representation
appear unlikely to constitute a lack of opportunity to be heard. 286
The case precedents seem inconsistent. In Tahan v. Hodgson,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colombia Circuit
determined that personal service on a defendant in Israel was
sufficient even though the service papers were in Hebrew, a
language which the defendant did not comprehend. 287 Also
relevant were the circumstances that the defendant transacted
business in Israel for a number of years and that he was aware of
the legal nature of the papers.288 In such a scenario the defendant
"should have surmised that the papers being served upon him
were legal in nature and that he could ignore them only at his own
280. Tahan, 662 F.2d at 864.
281. Pittman, supra note 61, at 978.
282. Tahan, 662 F.2d. at 866 (finding that it would be unrealistic for the United States
to require all foreign judicial systems to adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
283. Id. at 864; Corporaci6n Salvadoreha de Calzado v. Injection Footwear Corp., 553
F. Supp. 290,296 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
284. Tahan, 662 F.2d. at 866 (stating that though Israeli procedure is inconsistent with
federal rules requirement of second notice for default judgement, United States is
unrealistic to require all foreign judicial systems to adhere to federal rules).
285. Id. at 865-66 (finding that personal service in Israel was sufficient when suit
papers were prepared in Hebrew, even though the defendant did not read Hebrew).
286. See, e.g., Laskowky v. Laskowsky, 504 So. 2d. 726 (Miss. 1987) (holding that later
withdrawal of counsel does not constitute lack of opportunity to be heard).
287. Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862,866 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
288. Id. at 865.
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peril. '289 As a consequence, the court found that the defendant
received sufficient notice to compile a defense. On the other hand,
in Julen v. Larson,290 the court refused to enforce a German
judgement on the ground that service of process in Germany on a
U.S. defendant without an English translation was insufficient. It
is hardly surprising that dyspeptic litigants are left in confusion
over the legitimate ambit of the natural justice defence and its
open-textured scope.
The Uniform Recognition Act states that a court may, at its
discretion, refuse to recognize a foreign judgement if there is
insufficient notice of the foreign action to the defendant.291 The
discretionary process implicated was evaluated by Martinez in his
discussion of the significant decision in Gondre v. Silberstein.292
As Martinez states, "a French court entered a judgement of guilt
on a criminal charge, holding the defendant in default due to his
failure to appear." Following judgement, the court sentenced the
defendant to prison and ordered him to pay civil damages. 293 The
defendant filed an "opposition" to the entry of default, in
accordance with the terms of the French Code of Criminal
Procedure. 294 Despite the fact that the defendant did not submit to
arrest as required by the Code, the opposition was declared
void.295 Subsequently, the plaintiff began an action in New York
to effect the enforcement of the civil element of the earlier
judgement and requested summary judgement. In response, the
defendant claimed that he failed to receive fair notice of the
French proceedings and thus, the judgement should not be
supererogatory pursuant to the Uniform Act as activated in New
York.296
289. Id.
290. Julen v. Larson, 101 Cal. Reptr. 796,798 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
291. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgements Recognition Act, supra note 76, §§ 4 (b)(1)-
4(b)(2).
292. Gondre v. Silberstein, 744 F. Supp. 429 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); Martinez, supra note 61,
at 60-61.
293. Gondre, 744 F. Supp. at 430; Martinez, supra note 61, at 60, n.71. Under French
law a victim of a crime may file a civil action for money damages caused by a criminal
defendant. The civil and criminal actions are then joined. Gondre, 744 F. Supp. at 430-31.
294. Note that Article 489(1) of the French Code of Civil Procedure provides that a
default judgement, "becomes void in all its provisions if the accused submits an opposition
to its execution." Gondre, 744 F. Supp. at 431.
295. Id.
296. Id.
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The Court in Gondre began its determination by quoting
language from the U.S. Supreme Court:
[A]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process
in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
an opportunity to present their objections.297
Additionally, the court referred in detail to section 4(b)(1) of the
Uniform Act as activated in New York and rationalized that the
defendant did not receive notice. The court rejected the argument
that notice through diplomatic channels, as attempted in this case,
was sufficient under French law. In essence, the court asserted
that, "a description of the notice attempt was lacking in the case,
and thus, the plaintiff failed to show sufficient notice so as to
resolve the material issues of fact. ' '298 Furthermore, the court
declared that, "although an "opposition" to a default judgement
cures any defects in notice under French law, the manner in which
the judgement was rendered raised due process concerns, and that
indeed, where the defect in notice .ffends traditional due process
standards, the fact that the defe>d ant was served in accordance
with the foreign rules, or that the judgement is valid in the first
state, will not necessarily save the judgement. ' '299
It is significant that the court in Gondre deploys a synergy
between notice requirements (natural justice) and due process
(jurisdictional competence test).300 This synergy exemplifies the
297. IL (quoting from Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 399 U.S. 306, 314
(1950)).
298. Id. at 435 (denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgement).
299. Id. at 433 (quoting Kulzer, "The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgements
Recognition Act" 13 N.Y. Jud. Conf. Rep. 194, 213). Additionally, the Gondre court cited
Somportex as the proper standard. "The ultimate question, therefore, is whether a
reasonable method of notification was employed and reasonable opportunity to be heard
was afforded to the person affected." Id. at 434 (quoting Somportex Ltd v. Philadelphia
Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435,443 (3d Cir. 1971)).
300. Martinez, supra note 61, at 61. Regarding notice and its interplay with service,
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit in Ma v. Continental Bank N.A., 905
F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1990), opined as follows:
Although service of process is an ingredient of personal jurisdiction as that term
often is used in the United States, not all of the technical requirements of service
are sufficient grounds for a collateral attack. Service is designed to produce
knowledge; although rules may and usually do require formal service in order to
make very sure of knowledge, and courts may dismiss a case when proper
service has not been secured, the sort of jurisdiction pertinent to a collateral
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integration in the recognition process and overlap between the
requirements of the Uniform Act. A heightened degree of
collinearity should also apply to the fraud defence. A judgement
obtained fraudulently violates standards of due process envisioned
in the Constitution. Moreover, a court may vouchsafe its decision
on alternative theories, one that provides for mandatory
nonrecognition, or one that provides for discretionary
nonrecognition. The ability to utilize alternative theories is
precluded by the Brussels Convention template explored in Part
V. The harmonised scheme adduced allows a very limited purview
of discretionary nonrecognition defences. The natural justice test
on due notice and opportunity to defend is clearly defined after
the European Court of Justice's extensive interpretations. 30 1
2. Natural justice and the English common law approach
The concrete and defined nature of the natural justice defence
under the auspices of the Brussels Convention contrasts markedly
with the nebulous Anglo-American traditional approach. It is
extremely difficult to determine prophylactically the exact ambit
of the natural justice defences under English common law
principles. Courts applied the defence in a chauvinistic and
English-centric manner. Prior to Adams v. Cape Industries, it was
assumed that the defence applied to ensure that the defendant
received due notice and a proper opportunity to be heard by the
foreign court, embraced within the maxims of the rule audi alteram
partem or nemo iudex in rem suam.30 2 For example, English
standards would consider it unfair to deny the defendant a hearing,
where the plaintiff in the foreign action agrees to extra time for
filing a defence but proceeds to obtain a default judgement in
breach of the agreement.30 3 Jet Holdings Inc. v. Patel3°4 held that
even where the defendant actually raised the issue of natural
justice in the adjudicating court, it could still be validly raised
again at the enforcement stage. 30 5 The Court of Appeal in Adams,
attack depends on whether the plaintiff uses a method reasonably calculated to
produce actual notice.
Id. at 1076.
301. Art. 27 (2) as amended by the Brussels Regulation, effective from 1 March, 2002;
see infra Part V.C.
302. Rudd v. Rudd, P. 72,77-78 (1924).
303. Levin v. Gladstein, 55 SE 371 (1906).
304. Jet Holdings Inc. v. Patel, 1 Q.B. 335 (1990).
305. CHESHIRE AND NORTH, supra note 53, at 443.
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however, clearly extended the natural justice defence' to cases
involving procedural defects, leading to "a breach of an English
court's views of substantial justice." 30 6 Such a test is inherently
uncertain and loosely defined. It remains to be seen how English
courts apply it as a safeguard device. It is submitted that the
natural justice defence, as under the Brussels Convention, be
limited to the rules of audi alteram partem or nemo iudex in rem
suam. Where cases arise of procedural unfairness, which do not
involve a lack of due notice or opportunity to be heard, they would
be more satisfactorily dealt with under the defence of public
policy.
In Adams, the defendant company had proper notice of the
proceedings but consciously decided not to contest them. The
Texas trial judge, in default of their appearance, directed a total
award representing an average payment of $75,000 per plaintiff,
206 in total, but it was the plaintiffs' counsel who was subjectively
empowered to select the level of the bands and to identify the
plaintiffs to be placed in each band in order to produce the
directed average award. The Court of Appeal determined that this
assessment was not in any real sense based upon an objective
assessment by the judge upon evidence as to the condition of these
plaintiffs. 30 7  English notions of substantial justice required,
according to Slade IJ, that: "the extent of the defendant's
obligation is to be assessed objectively by the independent judge
upon proof by the plaintiff of the relevant facts." 30 8 The amount
of compensation should not be fixed subjectively by or on behalf
of the plaintiff.
The question was also raised in Adams whether it was
incumbent upon the defendants to have sought a remedy in Texas
in regard to the lack of natural justice.30 9  Their Lordships
answered this proposition in the negative on the facts of the case.
No evidence existed that the defendants had any knowledge of the
"bizarre" damage assessment method in the United States until
the late stage when enforcement was requested by the plaintiff in
England. It was apparently unreasonable to expect the defendant
to avail itself of a foreign court's remedy, where the breach was
306. Adams v. Cape Indus., 1 All E.R. 929, 965 (1991).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 967.
309. CHESHIRE AND NORTH, supra note 53, at 452.
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fundamental and deprived it of notice and opportunity to
participate in the adjudicating court.
310
A tactical dilemma exists for defendant corporations in
deciding whether to challenge foreign jurisdiction and judgement
abroad. The directors of a defendant corporation may reasonably
believe, based upon sound advice, that the corporation was not
present within the jurisdiction of the foreign court at the date of
the issue of process. If they are correct, they can contemptuously
ignore foreign proceedings vis-A-vis the safety of their assets within
the jurisdiction of the English courts. However, if their
assumption is incorrect, which following Adams may be a question
of considerable complexity to determine, then they may be sued in
England on the basis of a judgement which cannot be questioned
in relation to the merits and substance of the decision upon which
the judgement is based.311 Furthermore, the default judgement
itself may be inflated as it will be based upon evidence presented
purely by the plaintiff alone. A similar odious choice is presented
to the unfortunate defendant over reliance upon breach of natural
justice as a defence. A defendant who formally complains to the
foreign court directly about a procedural irregularity will, by the
act of submission, have presumptively conferred jurisdiction on the
foreign court which may not otherwise have existed.
Alternatively, by keeping his powder dry, he may be debarred
from relying on breach of natural justice at the recognition stage if,
contrary to Adams, it is considered eminently reasonable to
challenge abroad, where the breach is not fundamental, and
evidence exists that the defendant has notice. 312  Corporate
defendants may be presented with a beguiling Hobson's Choice
over how to proceed.
It is also important to reiterate that the concept of denial of
substantial justice is more general, and far wider, than the
traditional notion of natural justice. It represents an explicit
policy-oriented device for English courts to apply with great care.
In essence, it is far more akin to public policy, which would have
been the obvious defence to have applied in Adams. The nature of
"substantial justice" has been expertly summarised by Carter as
follows:
310. BRIGGS AND REES, supra note 115, at 264.
311. Cape Indus., 1 All E.R. at 960.
312. BRIGGS AND REES, supra note 115, at 264.
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The thrust of the defence of contravention of English notions of
substantial justice is different and more general. It could almost
be seen as an ultimate discretion to withhold recognition simply
because in the eyes of the English forum justice was palpably
not done. In the final analysis it represents a prerogative of the
forum - but, of course, a prerogative not to be abused.
313
The inherent danger of the overbroad "prerogative" adopted
by the English Court of Appeal in Adams is that it serves to
expand unduly the basis for impeachment of judgements rendered
in the United States, and puts unnecessary inroads into doctrines
of preclusion and international comity. In this sense it is the
unfortunate corollary of the U.S. public policy decisions in
Bachchan and Telnikoff on English libel judgements.314 The
overbroad "safety-valve" created by reference to "substantial
justice," as determined on an ad hoc fashion by English judiciary,
reveals more deep-seated fears over the American litigation
system. There is a strong English dislike for American punitive
damages, the trebling of compensatory damages as a penalty,
damages fixed by juries, the unpredictability of actions, class
actions, and onerous pre-trial discovery. 315 In order to have a
successful multilateral Convention, these barricades need to be
broken. More specifically, the imprecise Anglo-American
perspectives on the natural justice defence need to be remedied.
An optimal template is provided by the Brussels Convention
analysis, as recently amended by the Brussels Regulation. This
Convention is analogous to other strictly defined defences, laid
down at a European level.
V. THE BRUSSELS CONVENTION PERSPECTIVE: RESIDUAL RULES
FOR THE DEFENCES OF FRAUD, PUBLIC POLICY AND NATURAL
JUSTICE
A. General Principles
The central tenet of the Brussels Convention is to create a
free market in judgements,316 ensuring that a judgement rendered
313. P.B. Carter, Decisions of British Courts During 1988, 59 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L 360,
363 (1989).
314. Simeone, supra note 95, at 341.
315. Cassell and Co. v. Broome, A.C. 1027, 1087-88 (1972).
316. Julie E. Dowler, Forging Finality: Searching for a Solution to the International
Double-Suit Dilemma, 4 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 363, 390-391 (1993).
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by one Contracting State may be recognised and enforced in all
other Contracting States expeditiously.317  International
agreement in bases of jurisdiction significantly simplifies the
recognition and enforcement of judgements. 318 This comports to
the new model of jurisdictional propriety put forward in the
Anglo-American context in Part III.
The jurisdictional rules of the Brussels Convention provide
significant guarantees for the defendant. As a general rule, subject
to special provisions, a defendant can only be sued in the courts of
his domicile. If a defendant does not appear, the court on its own
motion declares that it lacks jurisdiction, unless stated otherwise in
the Convention. Furthermore, the court must stay the proceedings
unless satisfied that the defendant had an opportunity to be heard.
The strictness of these jurisdictional provisions is counter-balanced
by the liberal circulation of judgements among the Contracting
States. The Brussels Convention essentially ensures that
judgements within the "common market" of European
Contracting States maintain their worth and enforceability within
that community.
319
As Reuland has described, "the Brussels Convention does not
merely simplify the formalities governing the mutual recognition
and enforcement of judgements, it introduces a novel and
streamlined body of laws applicable to the recognition and
enforcement of judgements in Europe." 320 In exchange for an
"indirect" system of enforcement of the pre-community era, the
Brussels Convention provides for "direct" enforcement where the
judgements of one Contracting State are per se enforceable in the
courts of another.321 Indeed, it has been legitimately stated that
judgements of the various Contracting States are not unlike the
sister-state judgements of the United States. 322 In contrast to the
English common law position, Title III of the Convention
simplifies the regime by making it generally impermissible to
object to original jurisdiction at the recognition stage. Thus, it is
317. C.M.V. CLARKSON & JONATHAN HILL, JAFFEY ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS
175-76 (1997).
318. Id. at 176.
319. MCLEAN, supra note 109, at 163.
320. Robert C. Reuland, The Recognition of Judgements in the European Economic
Community: The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Brussels Convention, 14 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 559, 574 (1993).
321. Id.
322. Woodward, supra note 10, at 316.
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incumbent on the defendant to raise jurisdictional challenges from
the outset.
A striking feature of the Convention rules is that they apply
to all civil and commercial judgements that comport to Title I.
They do not depend at the enforcement stage upon the domicile or
nationality of the plaintiff or defendant. The Title III provisions
on recognition and enforcement are not expressly linked to the
jurisdictional grounds of Title II, as far as "outsiders" to the
scheme are concerned. This has caused great concern among
American commentators as it arguably operates in a parochial and
self-serving manner against non-Contracting States.323 In essence,
the principle of largely unquestioning judgement recognition
includes judgements against persons not domiciled in the
European Union, and thus not protected by the Convention, even
if the judgement is entered on an admittedly exorbitant
jurisdictional basis under Article 3. One illustration is a German
court in a civil and commercial matter that takes jurisdiction under
Article 23 of the German Code of Civil Procedure 324 over a U.S.
domiciliary who left his umbrella behind in a hotel room in
Germany.325  Other national courts within the Brussels
Convention members would be duty-bound to recognise this
decree. The rules for recognition, unlike those of jurisdiction, are
not based upon domicile.
B. Article 25: The Meaning of Judgement Given in a Contracting
State
Article 25 provides a wide definition of "judgement" in the
Brussels Convention as, "any judgement given by a court or
tribunal of a Contracting State." 326 Thus judgements of inferior
and superior courts fit under this umbrella, as do tribunal awards
which are of a nonprivate body.327 Unlike the traditional Anglo-
American common law position, the Convention is not restricted
to money judgements, but embraces injunctions, decrees of
323. See, e.g., Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Sister-State
Judgements: Reflections on General Theory and Current Practice in the Eurpoean
Economic Community and the United States, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1044 (1981); Bruce M.
Landay, Another Look at the EEC Judgements Convention: Should Outsiders Be
Worried?, 6 DICK. J. INT'L L. 25 (1987).
324. This concerns temporary presence of property as a jurisdictional basis.
325. CHESHIRE AND NORTH, supra note 53, at 480-519.
326. Brussels Convention, supra note 58.
327. CHESHIRE AND NORTH, supra note 53, at 483.
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specific performance, and interlocutory orders provided they are
not simply regulating procedural matters.
328
C. Article 27: Defences to Recognition
The Convention defences to foreign judgement recognition
are very strictly circumscribed. The primary defence contained
within Article 27(2) (as revised) provides for refusal of
recognition. When read together with Article 34, this primary
defence provides for refusal of enforcement in exceptional cases
where the laws of the judgement state and in the Convention are
insufficient to ensure the defendant's opportunity to present his
defence. Following minor amendments on 1 March, 2002 via the
Brussels Regulation, it is an appropriate juncture to evaluate the
Convention model defences and related ECJ jurisprudence. The
revised natural justice defence may now provide a suitable Anglo-
American common law model.
1. Article 27(1): Public Policy
Article 27(1) of the Brussels Convention states that a
judgement shall not be recognised, "if such recognition is contrary
to public policy in the State in which recognition is sought.
329
The revision retained the public policy exception in the Brussels
Convention, but with the requirement that recognition must be
manifestly contrary to public policy.330 Clearly, broadening the
public policy defence would undermine the Convention's aim
towards the free movement of judgements throughout Contracting
States. Hence, as stated in the Jenard Report, Article 27(1)
"ought to operate only in exceptional cases." 331 In keeping with
this expression, Article 28 narrows this "safety-valve release"
which precludes courts from applying the public policy exception
to jurisdictional matters. The European Court of Justice strictly
328. A Mareva injunction is an interlocutory injunction restraining a defendant from
removing his assets out of the jurisdiction pending trial. In Germany the two main
interlocutory remedies are the Arrest and the einstweilige Verfiigung, which have
increasingly become of vital importance in "the daily work of the courts for the purposes
of the effective administration of justice." Jens Grunert, Interlocutory Remedies in
England and Germany: A Comparative Perspective, 15 Civ. Just. Q. 18 (1996).
329. Brussels Convention, supra note 58, art. 27(1), 5; PETER KAYE, LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN JUDGEMENTS CONVENTION 4028 (Barry Rose Law Publishers Ltd, 1987).
330. W.A. Kennett, The Brussels I Regulation, 50 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 725,733 (2001).
331. Council Report, supra note 28, at 44.
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applied this principle in the recent case of Bamberski v.
Krombach.
332
Although the 1968 Convention does not state specifically
whether recognition may be refused under Article 27(1) pursuant
to a fraud defense, such conduct is generally considered grounds
for applying the public policy doctrine. 333 The Schlosser Report
included fraud within the ambit of public policy, reasoning that
obtaining a fraudulent judgement can "in principle constitute an
offence against the public policy of the State addressed. ' 334 The
treatment of fraud sharply illuminates the rationality gap between
Convention and non-Convention defences. As described in the
previous section, fraud under the common law unravels all.
English courts will re-investigate the merits of a foreign judgement
where credible evidence of fraud is presented even though no
direct fresh evidence need be adduced; and U.S. courts have
shown a willingness to re-investigate the merits on allegations of
extrinsic fraud. This re-investigation contradicts the fundamental
requirements under Articles 29 and 34 of the Convention that
"under no circumstances may a foreign judgement be reviewed as
to its substance." 335  The strict delineation was applied in
Interdesco SA v. Nullifire Ltd.3 36
In Interdesco, the plaintiffs were manufacturers of
intumescent paint which had special fire protection properties. 337
When heated, the paint expanded to form a meringue over the
painted surface; the longer it survived in a fire, the better
protection it afforded. Their best-selling product was marketed as
"S60," indicating that it gave protection for at least sixty minutes.
The defendant, an English company, entered into a five-year
distribution agreement with the plaintiffs that gave the defendant
exclusive distribution rights in the United Kingdom and Ireland
for the paints. Subsequently, the defendant terminated the
agreement claiming that Interdesco's S60 failed to satisfy the
United Kingdom standard for sixty-minute paint, making it
unmarketable. The plaintiff contended that the defendant acted
pursuant to a carefully prepared plot, in breach of their contractual
332. Bomberski v. Krombach, 3 W.L.R. 488 (2001).
333. Schlosser Report, OJ. 1979 (C59) 128 192(a).
334. Id.
335. Brussels Convention, supra note 58, arts. 29, 34.
336. Interdesco S.A. v. Nullifire Ltd., 1 Lloyd's L. Rep. 180, 187 (1992).
337. Id. at 182.
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duty, to replace Interdesco and steal their market.338 The French
Cour d'Appel de Paris, relying on expert evidence from tests
conducted in Paris while disregarding English tests showing the
product to be sub-standard, awarded substantial damages to the
plaintiff.339 When the plaintiffs attempted to enforce the award in
England pursuant to the Convention, the defendant argued that
recognition of the French judgement was contrary to public policy
in England because it was procured by fraud. 340 The defendant
submitted fresh evidence, not previously submitted before the
French court, which allegedly established that the plaintiff's
assertions were falsehoods that deliberately concealed and
suppressed tests, demonstrating that the S60 paint was sub-
standard.
341
The English court, rejecting the defendant's defence
predicated on public policy via fraud, established that
fundamentally different criteria apply to Convention and non-
Convention principles.342 First, where the Contracting State has,
"in its judgement, ruled precisely the same matters that a
defendant seeks to raise when challenging the judgement on the
ground of fraud, the Convention precludes the Court from
reviewing the conclusion of the foreign court. 343  Thus, the
English court is necessarily estopped from reviewing the matter
already addressed by another Contracting State. As Kaye
asserted, this means that "Article 27(1), including its application to
fraud, is subordinate to the Convention no-review-of-substance
principle."344
Additionally, when a Convention judgement is challenged on
the ground that the foreign court was fraudulently deceived, the
English court has a duty to initially consider whether the foreign
jurisdiction offers a remedy for such fraud.345  If the foreign
jurisdiction offers such a remedy, the logical corollary is to leave
the defendant to pursue that remedy in the original jurisdiction.
346
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 183.
341. Id.
342. Id. at185.
343. Id. at 187.
344. PETER KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGEMENTS 1447
(Barry Rose Law Publishers Ltd., 1987).
345. Interdesco S.A. v. Nullfire Ltd., 1 Lloyd's L. Rep. 180, 188 (1992).
346. Id.
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Affirming the primacy of the adjudicating court has attendant
benefits. It accords with "the spirit of the Convention that all
issues should, so far as possible, be dealt with by the State enjoying
original jurisdiction," and presumes that the original court can
better "assess whether the original judgement was procured by
fraud.,,34
7
At issue here is which court should actually adjudicate upon
the issue of fraud. Deference to the adjudicating court is generally
apposite within the scheme of the Convention, given the uniform
level of judicial competence throughout the Contracting States.
The Schlosser Report addressed this perspective as follows:
[T]here is no doubt that to obtain a judgement by fraud can in
principle constitute an offence against the public policy of the
State addressed. However, the legal system of all Member
States provide special means of redress by which it can be
contended, even after the expiry of the normal period for an
appeal, that the judgement was the result of a fraud.... A
court in the State addressed must always, therefore, ask itself
whether a breach of its public policy still exists in view of the
fact that proceedings for redress can be, or could have been,
lodged in the court of the State of origin against the judgement
allegedly obtained by fraud.348
The principles derived from Interdesco were similarly applied
in Soci t d'Informatique Service R~alisation Organisation v.
Ampersand Software BV.349 SISRO obtained a French judgement
against Ampersand and others in the Tribunal de Grand Instance
de Paris, wherein they successfully claimed that the defendant's
computer programs infringed their copyright. 350 Enforcement was
sought in England where the issue was whether the alleged fraud
on the part of the plaintiff made the issue contrary to English
public policy.351 Ampersand. appealed in France against the
judgement, but the appeal had not been heard before the
application for registration in England.352 Arguably fraud, as a
public policy defence, is inapplicable unless (1) no adjudicating
court offers a means of redress; (2) cogent evidence is adduced
347. Id.
348. Schlosser Report, 1979 OJ. (C59) 128 192.
349. Socidtd d'Informatique Service Realisation Organisation v. Ampersand Software
B.V., 2 CEC (CCH) 580 (1995).
350. Id. at 582-83.
351. Id at 583,594.
352. Id. at 593.
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which could not have been expeditiously raised before the foreign
court; and (3) this evidence is causally essential to the outcome of
the matter.353 Because of these restrictions a client would be well-
advised to raise challenges before the adjudicating court, and not
at the recognition or enforcement stage. Reliance on evidence of
fraud at the enforcement stage that could, and ought, to have been
raised earlier before the foreign court is generally fatal under the
Convention. 354 The underlying policy is to achieve the central
tenet of ensuring the simplification of recognition and
enforcement procedures.
More generally, the ambit of "public policy" itself was
evaluated by the European Court of Justice in the recent case of
Bamberski v. Krombach.355 The court's rationale, which looks at
whether a fundamental right of the recognizing court would be
unduly impinged,356 mirrors to a significant degree the optimal
model suggested in Part IV of this article. 357 In general, public
policy is a state and not an individuated concern.
In Bamberski, the defendant, a doctor of German nationality,
administered an injection of Cobalt-Ferrlecit to a young girl, the
claimant's daughter, who was staying at his home in Lindau,
Germany. 358 The girl died in July 1982 and, as a result, the
German authorities instituted criminal proceedings against the
defendant for manslaughter.359 The proceedings, which lasted
several years, were discontinued for lack of evidence.
360
The claimant lodged a complaint with the French authorities
against the defendant, whom he held responsible for his daughter's
death. In 1993 the defendant was committed for trial before the
Cour d'Assises, Paris (Paris Assizes), on a charge of wilful murder.
The claimant introduced a civil claim in the proceedings. A
summons to appear before that court was served on the defendant
at his home in Lindau, together with the civil claim for damages
associated with the criminal proceedings. The Cour d'Assises,
Paris, subsequently issued a warrant for his arrest to compel him to
353. HILL, supra note 129, at 276.
354. KAYE, supra note 344, at 1447-48 (discussing the difficulty in reviewing
judgements on the basis of fraud).
355. Bamberski v. Krombach [2001] 3 WLR 488,490-91.
356. Id. at 497.
357. See infra Part IV.
358. Bamberski, [2001] 3 WLR at 490.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 490-91.
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appear at the trial. The Cour d'Assises found that he had failed to
appear in person and consequently refused to allow his lawyers to
represent him and ruled that the written statements of defence
presented by them were inadmissible. 361  The French court
ordered the defendant to pay the claimant a total of Fr 350,000 in
damages and Fr 100,000 in reimbursement of court and defence
costs.
Enforcement of the judgement was sought in Germany. The
Bundesgerichtshof referred the question, inter alia, to the
European Court of Justice, whether refusal to allow the defendant
to have his defence presented, unless he appeared in person,
contravened the public policy defence of Article 27(1). A positive
response was elicited from the Court. Recourse to the public
policy clause in Article 27(1) of the Convention can be envisaged
only where recognition or enforcement of the judgement delivered
in another Contracting State would be at variance to an
unacceptable degree with the legal order of the state in which
enforcement is sought in as much as it infringes a fundamental
principle.362 This correlates to the new optimal model for public
policy suggested in Part IV. In order for the prohibition of any
review of the foreign judgement as to its substance to be observed,
the infringement would have to constitute a manifest breach of a
rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of the state in
which enforcement is sought or of a right recognised as being
fundamental within that legal order.363 With regard to the right to
be defended, to which the question submitted to the Court in
Bamberski referred, that unsurprisingly was viewed as occupying a
prominent position in the organisation and conduct of a fair trial
and as one of the fundamental rights deriving from the
constitutional traditions common to the member states.
2. Article 27(2): Natural Justice and inadequate notice of the
original action
The preponderance of Convention case law on applicable
defences have focused on ensuring the defendant's right to a fair
hearing, adequate notice, and protection against default
judgements. Article 27(2) provides a fundamental guarantee that
361. Id. at 509.
362. Id.
363. Id.
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enshrined rights of a defendant are not abrogated, and that
procedural protection is given as a shield.364 In accordance with
Article 27(2) a judgement shall not be recognised "where it was
given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not duly
served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with
an equivalent document in sufficient time to enable him to arrange
for his defence." 365  The revisions provided by the Brussels
Regulation have further restricted this natural justice defense, no
longer requiring "due" service on the defendant, but only service
"in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange
for his defence."
366
Additionally, there has been amendment made along the lines
previously argued for in Isabelle Lancray SA 367 and Minalmet
GmbH.368 If the defendant was unable to arrange for his defence,
the judgement shall not be recognised "unless the defendant failed
to commence proceedings to challenge the judgement when it was
possible for him to do so." 369 It should now, therefore, no longer
be possible for a defendant who had notice of proceedings pending
in another Member State to ignore them, knowing that they will
not be recognised in his home state. It is also noteworthy that
Article 46(2) requires documentation that establishes that the
party in default was served with the document instituting the
proceedings. The protection provided by Article 27(2) is
cumulative with the due notice protection before the adjudicating
court under Article 20(2)370 and Article 15 of the Hague
Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial
364. Note that under the Human Rights treatment the right to a fair hearing has been
treated as a fundamental, inviolable and sacred right, which implies the right to adequate
time and facilities for preparation of a defence; see Arts. 7 and 8 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations
Organisation on 10 December 1948; and Art. 6 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950.
365. Brussels Convention, supra note 58.
366. Council Regulation 44/2001/EEC, 2000 OJ. (L 12) 1.
367. Case 305/88, Lancray SA v. Peters and Sickert KG, 1990 E.C.R. 2725,2725-26.
368. Case C-123/91, Minalmet GmbH v. Brandeis Ltd., 1992 E.C.R. 5661.
369. Id.
370. It is provided by Article 20(2) that, where a defendant who is domiciled in one
Contracting State is sued in another Contracting State, the court should stay the
proceedings unless it is shown that, "the defendant has been able to receive the document
instituting the proceedings. . . in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence,
or that all necessary steps have been taken to this end."
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Matters. 371 The cumulative protection at both stages was clearly
set out by the European Court in Plendy Plastic Products v.
Pluskunkt.37
2
Indeed, it is instructive to further examine the European
Court of Justice jurisprudence on the legitimate ambit and policy
of the natural justice "safety-valve" defence. The solution
provided is more constrained than the nebulous and open-textured
defence of Anglo-American common law tradition. In Plendy
Plastic Products, a writ issued by a Dutch court was forwarded to
Germany for service upon the defendant, apparently in accordance
with the regulatory provisions of the 1965 Convention. Judgement
in default was given by the Dutch court, subsequent to their
receipt from a German local court that it had not been possible to
serve the document in question because of a change in residence.
The plaintiff then attempted to enforce the Dutch award in
Germany and the Bundesgerichtshof referred the matter to the
ECJ. It was held that the court addressed may refuse recognition
under Article 27(2) even though the adjudicating court regarded it
as proven, in accordance with Article 20(3) of the Brussels
Convention, in conjunction with Article 15 of the 1965
Convention, that the defendant who failed to enter an appearance
had an opportunity to receive service of the document instituting
the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to make
arrangements for his defence.373 However, it is vital to stress that
whereas the protection of Article 27(2) at the stage of recognition
and enforcement embraces every defendant,374 irrespective of
their domicile or residence, the initial protection within Article 20
and, of course, Article 15 of the 1965 Convention, at the stage of
371. By the material parts of Article 15 it is stated that:
where a writ of summons or an equivalent document had to be transmitted
abroad for the purpose of service, under the provisions of the present
Convention, and the defendant has not appeared, judgement shall not be given
until it is established that (1) the document was served by a method prescribed
by the internal law of the State addressed for the service of documents in
domestic actions upon persons who are within its territory; or (2) the document
was actually delivered to the defendant or to his residence by another method
provided for by the Convention, and that in either of these cases the service or
the delivery was effected in sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend.
Hague Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
and Commercial Matters, Nov., 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361,658 U.N.T.S. 163.
372. Plendy v. Pluspunkt, E.C.R. 2723, 2736 (1982).
373. Id.
374. This was confirmed by Debaecker v. Bouwman, Case 49/84, 1985 E.C.R. 1779.
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judgement before the adjudicating foreign court, is restricted to a
defendant either domiciled in another Contracting State to the
Convention, or alternatively is actually resident within a state
which forms a party to the 1965 Convention. 375 Thus this forms
another example of discriminatory and anomalous treatment
between domiciliaries of Contracting and non-Contracting States
to the Convention, as elaborated earlier.
a. judgement given in default of appearance
The leading authority on the natural justice defence under the
Brussels Convention is the ECJ judgement in Klomps v. Michel.376
The case involved the enforcement in the Netherlands of a
German judgement given to recover a debt, known as
mahnverfahren. The debt concerned agency fees in connection
with the purchase of land in Germany. The court did not effect a
personal service of the order for payment, but in the defendant's
absence, the order was lodged at a German Post Office. Written
notice of the order was left at the address in Germany provided by
the creditor, which, according to the adjudicating court,
constituted service at that address. Under the legislation in force
at the time, the defendant was allowed at least three days to
submit an objection to the order for payment. If no objection was
forthcoming, the plaintiff could ask for an enforcement order
vollstreckungsbefehl.377 A further period allowed the defendant to
have the enforcement order set aside. The defendant in Klomps,
however, allowed four months to pass before submitting such an
objection, and claimed that at the time of the summary
proceedings his habitual residence was in the Netherlands. The
objection was dismissed as untimely, following the German court's
holding that the defendant was habitually resident at the address
where service was effected.
The first issue which the European Court had to determine
was the meaning ascribed to the words "document instituting the
proceedings." Basically, was it necessary to account for the period
for submitting an objection to the payment order, or should
375. STONE, THE CONFLICr OF LAWS 340 (Longman, 1995).
376. Klomps v. Michel, E.C.R. 1593 (1981).
377. Id. at 1605-06.
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account also be taken of the time allowed for a defendant to lodge
an objection to the enforcement order? 378 The Court stated that:
Article 27(2) is intended to ensure that a judgement is not
recognised or enforced under the Convention if the defendant
has not had an opportunity of defending himself before the
court first seised. It follows that a measure, such as the order
for payment... in German law, service of which on the
defendant enables the plaintiff, where no objection to the order
is made, to obtain a decision which is enforceable under the
Convention, must be duly served on the defendant in sufficient
time to enable him to arrange for his defence and accordingly
that such a measure must be understood as being covered by
the words, "the document which instituted the proceedings" in
Article 27, point 2. On the other hand a decision, such as the
enforcement order ... in German law, which is issued following
service of an order for payment and which is in itself
enforceable under the Convention, is not covered by those
words even although the lodging of an objection against the
enforcement order, like the objection to the order for payment,
transforms the procedure into adversary proceedings.
379
Thus, the European Court of Justice has succinctly
interpreted the meaning given to "document instituting the
proceedings." It covers any document, such as the payment order
in German law, service of which enables the plaintiff under the
adjudicating State laws, to obtain, in default of appropriate action
taken by the defendant, a decision capable of being freely
recognised and enforced throughout the Contracting States.380 A
similar jurisprudence was applied in Hengst Import BV v.
Campese,381 where the plaintiff in a contractual dispute in Italy
commenced summary proceedings for a decreto ingiuntivo
requiring the defendant to pay the debt with interest and costs.
She sought to enforce the judgement in the Netherlands. The
defendant opposed this on the ground that the order could not be
considered to be a document which instituted proceedings under
Article 27(2) of the Brussels Convention. Applying the principles
established in Klomps, the court held that the decreto ingiuntivo,
together with the application instituting the proceedings, must be
378. Id. at 1606.
379. Id. at 1605-06.
380. Id. at 1606.
381. Case C-474/93, 1995 E.C.R 1-2113.
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regarded as, "the document which instituted proceedings or... an
equivalent document" within the meaning of Article 27(2).382
Klomps also gave interpretative guidance on the correct
meaning of "default of appearance." Appearance cannot be a
matter purely for the law of the adjudicating court, but must be
given a community meaning.383 A default judgement remains
within the ambit of Article 27(2) even where, after the judgement
has been given, the defendant subsequently applies to the
adjudicating court to have it set aside, if his application has been
dismissed because it was made outside the subsisting time limit.
384
The objection's dismissal means that the decision given in default
remains intact. For that reason, the objective of Article 27(2)
requires that the state addressed should carry out the examination
prescribed by that provision.
385
By way of contrast, the Court of Justice stressed in Sonntag v.
Waidmann386 that Article 27(2) was inapplicable where the
defendant had entered an appearance in the original proceedings.
The defendant, a German teacher, was criminally prosecuted in
Italy for manslaughter in respect of the death of a German pupil
on a school trip to Italy. The pupil's family joined these
proceedings as civil parties, seeking damages against the
defendant. Before the court in Bolzano, the teacher was
represented by a lawyer, and was found guilty of manslaughter and
ordered to pay twenty million lira to the pupil's family plus costs.
At the enforcement stage, he contended, inter alia, that the civil
award ancillary to criminal proceedings breached Article 27(2),
and thus should be unenforceable in Germany. It was determined
that the provision was inapplicable where the defendant had
appeared, provided he had been informed of the substance of the
case and been enabled to arrange his defence.387  Where a
represented defendant was able to state his case on the criminal
charges made against him, while being aware of the civil law debt
in the context of the criminal proceedings, that statement of his
case was in principle to be regarded as an appearance in the
proceedings as a whole. It was unnecessary to distinguish between
382. Id.
383. Case 166/80, Klomps v. Michel, 1981 E.C.R. 1593, 1607.
384. STONE, supra note 375, at 340.
385. Klomps, E.C.R. 1593 at 1607.
386. C-172/91, Sonntag v. Waidmann, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1963.
387. Id. at 488.
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the criminal and the civil proceedings, provided that the
defendant's lawyer representative was present when the court
dealt orally with the civil claim.38
8
b. sufficiency of time
It will be a factual matter as to whether a defendant has been
allocated sufficient time to arrange for his defence. The
recognizing court evaluates this time period independently, and
does not confine the analysis to the law of the original court.
389
Generally, the clock commences ticking from the moment of
service as determined by the law of the adjudicating court. What if
the defendant only became aware of the document at a date
subsequent to the initial service? The European Court in Klomps
identified such a scenario and helpfully elaborated on sufficiency
as follows:
[T]he court in which enforcement is sought may take account of
all the circumstances of the case in point, including the means
employed for effecting service, the relations between the
plaintiff and the defendant or the nature of the steps which had
to be taken in order to prevent judgement from being given in
default. If, for example, the dispute concerns commercial
relations and if the document which instituted the proceedings
was served at an address at which the defendant carries on his
business activities the mere fact that the defendant was absent
at the time of service should not normally prevent him from
arranging his defence, above all if the action necessary to avoid
a judgement in default may be taken informally and even by a
representative.
3 90
The constituents of "exceptional circumstances" in relation to
sufficient time were considered in Debaecker v. Bouwman,391 a
case involving a defaulting tenant decamping without payment.
The plaintiff had let commercial premises in Antwerp to the
defendant, a Dutch national, for the duration of nine years.
Shortly after the commencement of the lease Bouwman vacated
the premises without any notice and failed to submit notification
of any forwarding address. The plaintiff immediately brought
proceedings against him in the courts of Antwerp, and the writ was
388. STONE, supra note 375, at 341.
389. Case 228/81, Plendy Plastic Products B.V. v. Pluspunkt, 1982 E.C.R. 2723.
390. Case 166/80, Klomps v. Michel, 1981 E.C.R. 1593, 1608-09.
391. Case 49/84, Debaecker v. Bouwman, 1985 E.C.R. 1779.
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served on him at the local police station in accordance with
Belgian procedural law-the defendant was still registered as
resident in Antwerp. After a gap of only a few days, the plaintiff
received from the defendant a registered letter announcing his
repudiation of the lease and confirming details of a new address
which was a post office box number. The plaintiff, however, made
no attempt to serve the writ at the new address or even to inform
the defendant of the pending action. The Belgian court gave a
default judgement in favour of the plaintiff for over a million
Belgian francs. Proceedings were brought to enforce the
judgement in the Netherlands, and at issue was whether the
Article 27(2) criteria had been met. Essentially it was necessary to
decide whether exceptional circumstances applied. Although
proper service had been adopted under Belgian law, nevertheless
the defendant had not received notification of the legal
proceedings. Could factors after due service be ascribed to the
equation focusing on the behaviour of both the defendant and
plaintiff?
The Court of Justice considered significant the circumstances
after service was effected. It was relevant that the plaintiff became
aware of the defendant's new address four days after service of the
writ. Although the plaintiff has no overriding obligation to
communicate with him at the new address, wilful failure to do so
means that the recognising court ought to assess whether the
"exceptional circumstances" proviso becomes operative.392
Despite "circumstance" operating as merely a relevant factor, it
would be imprudent not to advise a plaintiff client to notify the
defendant of the proceedings at the latter's new address.
Although the gesture may prejudice their position, it may be
counter-balanced by the egregious conduct of a blameworthy
defendant. In the final analysis, the recognising court must
evaluate all the facts, weigh them against each other, and decide
what justice demands on sufficiency:
The defendant's behaviour cannot automatically rule out the
possibility of taking into account exceptional circumstances
which warrant the conclusion that service was. not effected in
sufficient time. Instead, such behaviour may be assessed by the
court in which enforcement is sought as one of the matters in
392. Trevor Hartley, The Enforcement of Judgements and the Requirements of Proper
Service under Article 27(2), 12 E.L. REV. 220,221 (1987).
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the light of which it determines whether service was effected in
sufficient time. It will therefore be for that court to assess, in
such a case as the present, to what extent the defendant's
behaviour is capable of outweighing the fact that the plaintiff
was apprised after service of the defendant's new address.
393
Thus, national courts need to appraise sufficiency in the
context of the surrounding circumstances. No single factor is
decisive, but relevant matters include the distance involved, the
commercial relationship between the parties, the need to obtain a
legal adviser, and requirements of translation.394 A surprising
feature has been the disparity between differing national courts.
German courts have held that twenty days was inadequate for a
German defendant to arrange a defence before a Belgian court.
The Italian courts have found adequate periods of twenty to thirty
days for Italian defendants to mount a defence before the original
European court.395 As far as English authorities are concerned, a
pragmatic approach was adopted in Noirhomme v. Walklate396 on
proper service, allowing service by post of a Belgian summons
even where it had not been translated into English.
397
D. A New Model
The lack of uniformity over the constituent elements of "due
service" in Article 27(2) necessitated numerous recourse to the
European Court, with delay and cost implications for common
ascertainable debts. It should be remembered that it is important
to reduce or eliminate the acerbities inevitable in litigation. It
represented a rare breach from the avowed aim of free movement
of judgements, and the Pavlovian response of rectification via the
Brussels Regulation provisions, effective from March 1, 2002, is to
be welcomed.398 The natural justice defence, as restructured,
393. Case 49/84, Debaecker v. Bouwman, 1985 E.C.R. 1779, 1801.
394. Case 166/80, Klomps v. Michel, 1981 E.C.R. 1593, 1621.
395. Wendy A. Kennett, Reviewing Service: Double Check or Double Fault?, 1 Civ.
JuST. Q. 115,143 (1992).
396. [1991] I.L.Pr. 581 (Q.B. 1991).
397. The case concerned damage allegedly caused by the defendant to rented property
in Belgium. It was determined that Article 10 of the Hague Service Convention permitted
postal service of the recongising court did not object, which was accepted by English law.
398. Council Regulation 44/2001/EEC, 2000 O.J. (L 12) 1. Note that the further
defences provided for in Articals 27(3)-(5), as amended by the regulation are outside the
ambit of this discussion. Article 27(3) relates to irreconcilable judgements. See Hoffman
v. Kreig, 1988 E.C.R. 645; Case 414/92, Solo Kleinmotoren GmbH v. Boch, 1999 E.C.R.
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reads as follows in that recognition or enforcement may be
refused: "Where the judgement was given in default of
appearance, if the defendant was not served with the document
which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document
in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless
the defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge the
judgement when it was possible for him to do so."
This reformulated test is an optimal model for the confines of
the natural justice defence in Anglo-American law, and for the
proposed multilateral Convention. The Preliminary Draft of the
Convention, strongly influenced by the Brussels Convention test,
refers in Art. 28(1)(d) to the natural justice "safety-valve." A
judgement in accordance with this provision may be denied
recognition or enforcement if, "the document which instituted the
proceedings or an equivalent document, including the essential
elements of the claim, was not notified to the defendant in
sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for
his defence." 399 The essence of natural justice as an operational
tool is implicated when a defendant fails to receive notice of
foreign proceedings or want of opportunity to participate. A
certain standard by which to evaluate these fundamental rights is
vitally significant for a new model of jurisdictional propriety for
Anglo-American foreign judgement recognition. There are a
number of beneficial consequences attached to the constrained
reformulated test. The chauvinistic and illusory notion of
"substantial justice" adopted in Adams is avoided: the precepts of
the defence are not illegitimately skewed; the solipsistic ad-hocery
that infects Anglo-American tradition is ameliorated; and vagaries
of inconsistency can be avoided by an effective test that protects
individual concerns.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In order for an economic union to function efficiently, a legal
judgement-like any other property interest-must not have its
value impaired merely by crossing a geographic border within
the union, and both the property interest represented by the
2237. The former Article 27(4) on preliminary issues as to status does not find a place in
the Regulation. Status issues are primarily a matter for the Brussels II legislation and any
future European legislation dealing with problems of family law.
399. See Preliminary Draft Hague Judgements Convention, supra note 44; see generally
Paul Beaumont, supra note 44.
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judgement, and the legal mechanism for enforcing rights in that
property interest, must be respected throughout the union.
400
A clear need exists for a global solution to the dilemma
presented by foreign judgement recognition. An effective panacea
may develop under the auspices of the Hague Conference and a
new multinational convention embracing jurisdictional concerns
and recognition and enforcement provision. Opposition,
especially at a European level, may stultify this initiative. As
currently structured, Anglo-American perspectives on foreign
judgement recognition appear hopelessly anachronistic.
Rationalisation is needed to show deference to foreign courts in
the name of comity, consistency, and convenience. It is suggested
that a new optimal model be crafted on the basis of respect for one
another's legal systems, and not on the basis of Maginot lines that
will not hold and should not hold.
A reformulated test is needed to allow for the systematic
accommodation of foreign laws and judgements in the domestic
legal system. There must be a transmogrification away from the
lack of consistency and array of variables that apply in the United
States to foreign judgement recognition. In England, the
ethnocentric and chauvinistic doctrinal analysis, rooted in
nineteenth century theories, needs to be resiled in the strongest
possible terms. A new reformulated Anglo-American doctrine on
recognition should begin with an appropriate search for a foreign
court that had jurisdiction in the international sense. A suitable
predicate involves the substantial integration of jurisdiction
principles with the test for jurisdictional competence. The
overriding policy concerns in this arena should refocus upon
interests of finality and conclusiveness of judgements; conservation
of judicial resources and certainty in the process; preclusion;
commercial convenience; and sufficient flexibility to allow a
dynamic test which allows for evolution of our recognition rules to
meet contemporary conditions.
This Article has suggested that a new optimal solution can be
crafted on the basis of jurisdictional propriety. The striking
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Morguard, promoting
concerns of "international comity," can be the ideal starting point
400. Ronald A. Brand, Recognition of Foreign Judgements as a Trade Law Issue: The
Economics of Private International Law, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 593 (Bhandari and Sykes eds., 1997).
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for a new reformulation. This is solidified by more concrete
precepts, inter-twinning commercial practicality on homogenous
grounds. The new template provides for a rebuttable presumption
of jurisdictional competence of the foreign court, but imposing a
reversed burden of proof upon the defendant to show that
recognition or enforcement would be unjust. The unjustness
criterion would then be equiparated in a novel manner to the
unconscionability test for restraint of foreign proceedings in the
jurisdictional context. Of course, barriers exist to this desired
reformulation. What, however, would justify the required Anglo-
American effort would be a genuine commitment to the principle
that civil controversies that cannot be settled by negotiation or
arbitration should be submitted to appropriate courts-but prima
facie only once.40 1 If the new model of jurisdictional propriety, as
suggested, can be attained, the world's democracies can respect
each other's judicial systems and have a shared perception of
essential fairness.
A discretionary element must form part of this new model in
the commitment to recognised defences of public policy, fraud,
and natural justice. These comprise an irreducible minimum
standard against egregious practices. Jurisdictional propriety
demands that the recognizing court should intervene only in
extreme cases where enforcement would result in violation of a
fundamental norm of substantive value or of procedural justice. If
acceptance of such discretionary elements is the price for being
labeled an idealist rather than an ideologue, it is one worth paying.
401. See Lowenfeld, supra note 153, at 303.

